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LITER

From the Duke of Montland.

PRICE OF THE CONDUCT

LETTER

TO

THE DUKE of MONTLAND.

(PRICE TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE.)

BUR

L E T T E R

to

The DUKE of BERLARD.



[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS SIXPENCE]

A
LETTER
TO
His Grace the Duke of Portland,
BEING A
DEFENCE of the CONDUCT

OF
HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS,
IN SENDING AN AMBASSADOR TO TREAT FOR PEACE

FRENCH DIRECTORY,
IN DEFENCE AGAINST THE
ATTACK MADE UPON THAT MEASURE

RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE;
AND AN ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Is compatible with the Safety of the Religious and Political Systems of
EUROPE.

THIRD EDITION. *k*

By JAMES WORKMAN, Esq.
OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE.

London:
PRINTED FOR J. OWEN, PICCADILLY.

1797.

LETTER

to

Mr. Grace the Duke of Portland,

SEVEN A

DEFENCE of the CONDUCT

of

His MAJESTY'S MINISTERS,

IN SPADING AN AMBASSADOR TO TREAT FOR PEACE

FRANCY DIRECTOR, ERRATUM.

In page 21, line third from the bottom, read Potentates of Europe.
ATTACK MADE UPON THAT MEASURE



RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES DURKEE;

AND AN ENDLESS CHAIN OF TERRAINMENT
REMOVED BY THE

FRANCY REPUBLIC

OF FRANCY, WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

E U R O P E .

THIRD EDITION

BY JAMES MORRISON Esq.

OF THE MILITARY SERVICE.

MONTGOMERY

PRINTED FOR J. OWEN, BICKERSTETH.

1791.

Yielded at Willm's glasse, 1711, & 1712, abore
my self or my selfe, is by me yd blesse
~~1711~~
yvnd one of the last dayes of the month of Jan
enreverred to the daye of my fforfeiture.

A

George

and quicke to his selfe and self
bothe id he dyre brennes, consti. 1711
abillitye brennes to **to** quicke to
adde vnto his brennes brennes to
adde vnto his brennes brennes to
adde vnto his brennes brennes to

The DUKE of PORTLAND.

My LORD,
those who are least dis-

posed to admit the justice of an author's prejudice
in favor of the subject he has chosen, will not be
so hardy as to deny the importance of that on
which I have now the honor to address your Grace,
when its difficulties occupy the talents of the most
able, and its consequences fill the minds of the
most courageous with anxiety. It was in the
auspicious moment when the wisdom of his
Majesty's councils had induced him to make an
effort to extinguish the flames of war which have
so long and so violently raged throughout the

B

world,

world, that a writer whose ability is hardly surpassed by his zeal, endeavours to light them up with fiercer fury than they have yet displayed and to feed them with such fuel that no one living could expect to see the end of their devouring progress.

That his arguments against negotiating for peace with France, maintained with all his wonted acuteness of reasoning, and adorned with all the splendor of his unfaded imagination, may make a deep impression upon the Legislature and his Majesty's Ministers is reasonably to be apprehended; and the objects of this letter are to prevent your Grace from being among the number of those on whom such impression may be made, and to save the country from the heavy misfortunes which she might suffer if his Majesty were counselled and the Public persuaded to act upon the opinions of Mr. Burke, by a Minister whose high character, acknowledged by every party for public and domestic virtues, would give force to his persuasions and his advice. I entertain too high an opinion of your Grace's good sense and politeness to suppose that you will deem this address presumptuous, or even require it to be prefaced with much apology. The greatness of the danger in which our country might be placed, affords an excuse for the humblest endeavour to avert it;

below

and

and the possibility of suggesting an hint which may be useful in the conduct of any of her important affairs, seems to me a full justification of him who publishes his observations on so high a national concern as that which I have undertaken to discuss.

The substance of Mr. Burke's Letters is nearly contained in the following propositions:

1st. That his Majesty's Ministers should not have recognized and negotiated with the Government of the French Republic, because the true and lawful French Nation is not now represented by that Government, nor to be found within the limits of geographical France, but in the foreign countries in which her lawful representatives are exiles.

2d. That his Majesty's Ministers should not have recognized and should not negotiate for peace with the French Republic, because she is of a wicked and abominable character, being governed by infamous robbers and murderers.

3d. That if we make peace with the French Republic, we shall not long be able to preserve our religion, property, constitution, or laws; and that the whole system of religion, laws,

government, usages, morals and manners now established in Europe will be destroyed.

That we ought therefore to continue the war until we subvert the Republican Government of France and the whole system on which it depends; that we should oppose to it for this purpose a force, bearing some analogy and resemblance to the force and spirit which that system exerts, and that our resources for carrying on war are still great and abundant.

I shall examine those propositions distinctly and nearly in the order in which I have arranged them.

The distinction made by Mr. Burke between the supposed moral nation of France, consisting of her exiled Prince and her expelled Nobility, Clergy and Gentry, and that supposed unlawful French Nation which now exists within the territories of France, and is represented by the present French Government may afford one subject of dispute on the right meaning of words, and another on the conduct which the Governments of Europe should observe with respect to recognizing and negotiating with one or other of those rival Nations. Which of the two ought to be called with propriety the true French Nation, or the true body politic

of France, is a question rather verbal than political, and therefore improper to be examined in a work professing only political discussion; nor is it within the scope of such a work to determine which of the two has the best claim to the affection of Frenchmen and to the esteem of mankind. But which of the two his Majesty should recognize in order to negotiate with, of right and for the advantage of his subjects, is a question on which Mr. Burke's opinion seems refutable with as much certainty as can be expected in any political demonstration.

When nations are said to recognize, correspond or negotiate with one another, nothing else can be meant than that some person or persons (almost always their Governments or certain branches of their Governments) are appointed to represent their respective nations. In no other mode can one nation, country, or people recognize or treat with another in its corporate capacity.

For what purpose is it that the Governments of nations or countries should correspond and negotiate with each other? Certainly for the benefit, either immediate or remote, of their respective subjects. It is this end which all the great objects of negotiation should have, and which it is always professed that they have in view. For what other

good

good purpose can it be required to ascertain boundaries, to determine disputed rights, or to regulate commercial intercourse?

When two Governments negotiate a treaty, they in fact do no more than make a law to bind the subjects of both. With whom then as the representative, and on the part of the French people is his Majesty, for the benefit of his subjects, to negotiate in order to ascertain boundaries, to determine disputed rights, to regulate commercial intercourse but with the persons who have the power to make laws for the French people, and to bind them to the observance of such agreements, restrictions and regulations, as in consideration of others for the benefit of the people of France, the representative of that people might agree to for the benefit of the people of England?

To negotiate a treaty, that is to join in an act of legislation with persons who have no power to legislate and whose laws would not only be disobeyed but despised by those whom they are intended (if they mean any thing) to bind, would be absurd and even ridiculous. To recognize as a national authority any persons who have no power to negotiate would be a mere ceremony which whatever pleasure it might afford to the corresponding parties, could be of no advantage to the subjects of him who made the recognition.

None

None therefore who do not possess power to legislate, are of competence to be recognized or treated with as the representative of a nation.

It is with a view to the interest of its subjects and not from esteem, pity or affection, that a Government acting upon just principles will begin and conduct its negotiations. It is not certainly to please or to do honor to France, or to any persons in France, or to any king or kingdom on earth that his Majesty negotiates treaties; but to remove the inconveniences under which his faithful people might labour, and to secure to them the advantages which they might not enjoy, if such negotiation were neglected. No one is ignorant that it would be for the benefit of the people of this country, to have their right to various places, which have been taken from the French in the Indies acknowledged and ascertained, and to have power to resume commercial intercourse according to fixed and known regulations with the people inhabiting the territories of France. But how is this right to be satisfactorily ascertained, and by whom are those regulations to be enforced, but by those whom the people inhabiting the territories of France obey? Let your Grace imagine that you were appointed Ambassador to what Mr. Burke calls the true French Nation, and that you were introduced to Louis and a Council of his

his exiled Nobility. Pity as well as your instructions might induce you to call him rightful King of France, and to recognize him and his unhappy companions as the rightful representatives of the French nation. You might lament their hard lot and wish them more prosperous fortunes. But could you, by this embassy, accomplish any thing towards the only object that could justify an Embassy, the advantage of your country? Could you save the property of our merchants from the annoyance of French privateers? Could you open the rich markets of France, Spain and Holland to their manufactures? Could you secure to the East India Company the undisturbed possession of Pondicherry, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon or Malacca? Would not the unhappy Prince consider any proposal to him, in his present circumstances, to obtain any of these advantages as a most cruel insult*? Might not your Grace as

* Having mentioned the name of Louis, I cannot help expressing my sincere wish that the French Directory, disregarding his denunciations of vengeance, will cease to exercise towards that unfortunate Prince, the unrelenting rigor with which they have hitherto pursued him; and that if incapable of being moved by the voice of pity, they will be too proud to let the world imagine that any individual can disturb their repose, and too magnanimous to persecute a man without power and almost without friends. I would also hope that whatever turn the popular opinion may take among us, the British Nation will be too

wisely treat with him respecting our intercourse with Canton or Constantinople, as with Paris? Mr. Burke may use the words French Nation in whatever sense his ingenuity or his affections may suggest. But the French nation with which the Governments of Europe have any business to negotiate, and which his Majesty on the part of his faithful people was wisely advised to acknowledge, is that people which now inhabits geographical France. With the members of the former and now exiled corporate body of France, his Majesty's subjects have no intercourse or connexion that requires any other regulations than such as may be obtained by negotiating with the Governments of the countries in which the unhappy exiles reside.

But suppose that this exiled corporate body did possess considerable power; or that one quarter,

generous, or rather too just, to abandon the persons whom it has encouraged to wage war against their country; and that, great as the pressure of necessary burdens may be, something more will be endured to save them from famine and death and the British character from infamy. We still possess fertile and delightful regions on the other side of the Atlantic. The French Emigrants cannot perhaps find a better lot than to be well settled in them: and although this arrangement would require a considerable disbursement from the public, the first expence would be the final one.

or one half of the French people had emigrated from France;—with which quarter or half should his Majesty negotiate? The question is answered by applying to the principle. A Government should recognize in every independent political body with which it holds correspondence, just so much dominion as that Body actually possesses, and should negotiate with it so far as the necessities or convenience of its subjects may require. If one half of the French people had emigrated, submitting as the actual emigrants have done to the Governments of the countries into which they fled, they would have no title, being subjects, to be recognized as an independent nation or people; nor would his Majesty, for the purpose of maintaining the relations that he might wish to exist between them and his subjects, find it necessary to recognize or negotiate with any other Governments than those which these emigrants obeyed. But if such emigrants, ambitious of becoming an independent people, had been strong enough to have given effect and indulgence to their ambition, then it might be prudent in his Majesty to recognize them as a nation, and to treat with them for all objects connected with the prosperity of this country over which they might have any command. Whether the stationary or the emigrated half of the people of France should be called the true French nation, might be the subject of much

much altercation between the candidates for the title. But prudent strangers, not fond of quarrelling about words, would easily avoid the dispute, by giving to the rivals some titles of distinction which would not be offensive to the pretensions of either of them.

I again repeat it, that if a Prince recognizes and negotiates with nations, or rather with the persons who represent them, for the advantage of his subjects and not merely to gratify his private feelings, he must recognize those only who are able to make the people composing such nations conform to the regulations which for the advantage of his subjects he may think proper to propose.

He should consider that he negotiates with the governor of a geographical district, containing so many inhabitants, no matter what the country of their nativity. For a Government can undertake to bind its subjects only; and none are *actually* subject to it but the inhabitants of its territory. When therefore we make a treaty with any power, with France for instance, it is never understood that the treaty shall be obeyed by all Frenchmen, but by all the subjects of France. If the interest of our commerce should require the intercourse between our merchants and the

Frenchmen who dwell in Cadiz or New-Orleans to be regulated in a particular manner, his Majesty would apply, not to the Government of France, but to the Court of Madrid to negotiate the regulations.

I urge this circumstance as an answer to the contempt with which Mr. Burke considers geographical arrangement in recognizing and negotiating with a nation. It proves as far as the established practice of all states can prove, not only that it is not possible for any persons without the territorial possessions of their nation, to be that nation or its representative for the purpose of being negotiated with, but that persons who quit the territories of their nation are no longer even a part of it for that purpose. They must be considered either as forming a new nation, or as increasing the population and power of an old one.

To illustrate his opinion, Mr. Burke supposes a dreadful calamity. He supposes all the royal family sacrilegiously murdered, and all the persons of worth, wisdom and respectability that England contains imprisoned, plundered, exiled or murdered by a faction of robbers. Is it, he demands, to this faction he is to look for his country? Would

Would not the exiles alone be his Government and his fellow-citizens? Would not their places of refuge be his temporary country? Would not all his duties and all his affections be there and there only? What should he think if the potentates of Europe, being geographers instead of kings, recognized this geometrical measurement as the honorable member of Europe called England?

This case forms no exception to the principle which I have ventured to lay down. Without impugning it, all of Mr. Burke's questions that are not purely verbal may be satisfactorily answered.

It is observable that with his usual dexterity in the management of arguments and analogies, he presumes that the duties of a British citizen and a foreign potentate, with regard to a British government, may be strictly and exactly the same. But this cannot happen. A Government, with regard to the citizen, is or ought to be a just and moral power. A Government with regard to a foreign potentate is a physical power, which, acting within its proper range, is independent of him by the laws of public right, and which it is his duty as a potentate to regard chiefly as it may affect the condition of his subjects. In Mr.

Burke's

Burke's case the affections and the duties* of every good citizen would certainly be with the exiles and the rest of his oppressed countrymen, and he should make every possible effort to deliver them from tyranny and to punish their tyrants. But the good citizen and the wise potentate would have different duties to observe. The one is bound to consider in the first place the rights and the happiness of his commonwealth; the other the welfare of his kingdom. The one acts entirely for the benefit of his countrymen, the other chiefly for the safety and prosperity of his subjects. The one should neither obey nor recognize any Government, (unless obliged by necessity or induced by strong considerations of prudence) except the rightful one; but should endeavour by all possible means to subvert any Government founded on the robbery of his countrymen and the violation of his country's rights; the other should recognize any Government whatever, and should, if possible, avoid going to war with any Government, however vile, that had the power to destroy the happiness of his people.

* I say the duties, for I cannot admit as a moral rule of conduct that part of our law which would justify us in yielding our obedience and giving our support to the vilest person in the world, if he were by any means to get possession of his Majesty's throne. See 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 36, and Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 4th, 78.

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I do not deny that this potentate would have a right to deliver our countrymen from the tyranny of the robbers. God forbid I should maintain such a selfish and ungenerous doctrine, as that human beings can ever be bound by their duty to behold tamely the wrongs of any of their fellow creatures, or that any people have not a full right to rescue any other from a galling bondage. Our affections should not be wholly absorbed by our country; they ought to extend to the whole human race.

But this right of one Government to interfere by force on behalf of the oppressed subjects of another, can only be acknowledged with severe restrictions, and must not be exercised but with great prudence. It would otherwise occasion endless wars and defeat its own generous purposes. The oppression that may be thus lawfully removed must be obvious, flagrant and galling. We have no right to redress any grievances in a foreign country that are not severely felt and loudly complained of; for no right can exist that would allow any one nation in the world to disturb at its pleasure the peace of all the rest. The potentate who would achieve the emancipation of an enslaved people should be morally certain that he is able to perform what he wishes to undertake. If he fails in his attempt he may not only ruin

his

his own subjects, but by enraging the tyrants, he will certainly make the condition of their victims more deplorable. He should also be well assured that the changes which he intends to introduce or countenance will be not only good in themselves, but agreeable to the objects of his generosity. Indeed his right extends no further than to deliver them from their oppressors. He may recommend measures; but if he enforces any that are important, against the inclination of the country for which they are designed, he vitiates all his proceedings from the beginning. His conduct shews that he was not actuated by benevolence but ambition. He is to be regarded not as a deliverer but as a conqueror. The transition from one of these characters to the other is so easy and natural, and has happened so very often, that a wise citizen will endure much before he seeks deliverance from a foreign power. Had your Grace lived in England during the tyranny of the fanatics, I am sure that you would not have called upon the Czar of Moscovy to deliver you; and that if he had sent over his armies here for that purpose, you would have opposed them almost as zealously as if he had declared that his objects were conquest and plunder.

Applying these principles to the solution of Mr. Burke's questions: any Potentate of Europe would have

have a full right to restore to us our liberties by force, if he were called upon by the voice or the feelings of the country. But he would not be morally bound to interfere thus in our concerns, if it were probable or even possible that his interference might ruin his kingdom. He would owe a duty indeed to our enslaved countrymen, but a much higher duty to his own subjects.

Suppose the situation of England was what Mr. Burke has imagined, and that your Grace was at the same time a Minister, directing the councils of any foreign State; of the kingdom of Portugal, for instance, or the republic of the United States of America. Would you refuse to recognize the English faction of robbers, if you knew that the refusal would stimulate them to interrupt an advantageous intercourse between England and your country; to plunder your merchants; to destroy your colonies or States; and perhaps to send out a navy that might lay Lisbon or Philadelphia in ashes? In these circumstances you certainly ought not to refuse. You would have no right to sport with the high charge entrusted to your keeping, nor to bring ruin on your country for any class of persons, however deserving and unfortunate.

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But the question of war or peace is not implicated in this question of recognition. We ought to recognize and correspond with the Government of a State which is our enemy, on the same principle of mutual advantage that would induce us to negotiate with that State, if it were our friend. Correspondence between Governments may diminish the calamities of their subjects in war almost as much as it can augment their prosperity in peace. In the prosecution of hostilities, how detrimental would it be to the belligerent parties, if conventions, which imply recognition, and which cannot take place without correspondence, were not entered into concerning the observance of capitulations, the exchange or ransom of prisoners, the care of the wounded, and the signals of defiance and submission? With whom, on the part of the warriors opposed to us, can we negotiate these conventions? With those only who are competent to undertake for the conduct of those warriors, that is, with the persons whom those warriors obey.

If, therefore, it were even right to continue the war with France for the subversion of her government, laws and manners, or for the restoration of the exiled king, or for any other object, it would be right to acknowledge as a Nation the people, however wicked or deluded, that we are fighting

fighting with, and to recognize as the Representative of that Nation, the Government, however infamous, which it obeys. Our recognition would not retard for one moment the attainment of our object, if it were attainable, and whether attainable or not, the recognition, without occasioning any evil, would be productive of many advantages to us, which without recognition we could not possess. It would be quite time enough to refuse or withdraw our recognition of this Government when we had accomplished its destruction.

" Mere locality," says Mr. Burke, " does not constitute a body politic. Had Cade and his gang got possession of London, they would not have been the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council." — True; they would not have been the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council, any more than the Directory, the Legislative Councils, and the existing Tribunals of France are the King, the States-General, and the ancient Parliaments. But yet had Cade maintained possession of London in spite of all the exertions of the Government; had he destroyed or plundered all those who attempted to expel him from that city, and had he obtained, either by force, fraud, or persuasion, the obedience of the citizens, it would have been unwise in the citizens of York or Bristol, whose affairs might

require them to come to the metropolis, to have refused to call Jack Cade Lord Mortimer, or to have given him any other title which his Lordship might have thought proper to assume. By making this recognition, they would probably have been able to prosecute their affairs without interruption; and by refusing it, they would not only have deprived themselves of many commercial advantages, but would have subjected themselves to the depredations of his Lordship's gang; although their refusal to acknowledge his title could not have had the smallest tendency to mitigate the evil or abridge the period of his usurpation*.

The acknowledgment by Henry VI. of Cade's title to govern London would not have been in the least similar to the late acknowledgment of the French Republic by his Majesty. Cade was the lawful subject, and London of the lawful

* Second part of Henry VI. Scene VI.

Enter JACK CADE.

CADE. Now is Mortimer Lord of this city.—And now, henceforward, it shall be treason for any that calls me other than Lord Mortimer.

Enter a Soldier running.

SOLDIER. Jack Cade! Jack Cade!

CADE. Knock him down there. [They kill him.]

SMITH. If this fellow be wise, he'll never call you Jack Cade any more; I think he hath a very fair warning.

dominions

dominions of Henry. The French Government is certainly not the lawful subject of ours, nor of any other Government, nor is France among the lawful dominions of his Majesty. Had Henry VI. acknowledged Cade's title, he would by that acknowledgment have released Cade's allegiance, and have given up to him an important part of his own dominions. His Majesty has not by the act of acknowledging the French Government released to the persons composing it, any debt of allegiance, nor recognized in them any right to any title or territory to which his Majesty had any lawful claim.

The second proposition deducible from Mr. Burke's letters, is, "That his Majesty's Ministers should not have recognized, and should not negotiate for peace with the French Republic, because she is of a wicked and abominable character, being governed by infamous robbers and murderers."

Admitting for the argument that she is of this character, and is so governed, the inference of Mr. Burke will not follow: because his Majesty, according to the practice of his illustrious predecessors, and of most of the Potentates in Europe, has long recognized the Government of what Mr. Burke calls the *Republic of Algiers*, a Govern-

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ment of as wicked and abominable a character as can well exist, and composed of as infamous materials as can enter into the composition of any public body whatever.

But Mr. Burke maintains that the analogical argument drawn from Algiers is not conclusive; for although he is willing to admit that this Algerine State has a Constitution similar to what he calls the present tumultuous military tyranny of France, and that the Algerine community resembles the community of France, yet he fears great danger from the recognition of the French Republic, and little or none from the recognition of Algiers. Algiers, he observes, is not near us, not powerful, not infectious; and as it is an old creation we have good data to calculate the whole of the mischief to be apprehended from it.

To determine whether or not a Government of an abominable character, and composed of infamous men should be recognized and negotiated with, we must be guided by considerations either of national character or national interest; we can only justify our refusal to recognize any State by a conviction that the measure is either dishonorable or imprudent.

If the question relative to the recognition of the French Republic, is upon the point of honor,

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the precedent of Algiers, notwithstanding what has been objected by Mr. Burke, is of sufficient authority to justify his Majesty's advisers; for considerations of danger can not be applied to determine a point of honor. They belong solely to questions of prudence and caution. If it be a stain upon our national honor, that we recognize and negotiate with Governments of infamous character and composed of infamous men, the stain is the same whatever power those Governments may possess, and in whatever part of the world they may be situated. It can certainly be no extenuation of the dishonor that may be incurred by a nation in recognizing and corresponding with infamy, that it resides at some hundred miles distance, or that it has preserved for any length of time the consistency of its abominable character. His Majesty's Ministers therefore in acknowledging the French Republic, however abominable its character, and however infamous the persons by whom it is governed, have not dishonored the British character unless our ancestors have dishonored it by acknowledging the Government of Algiers. But surely no Englishmen can be offended that the honor of his country is not now maintained with greater punctiliousness than was ever observed by his renowned and dreaded ancestors.

Considering

Considering the recognition of the Algerine Government only as a measure of prudence, the argument drawn from its analogy is irrefragable, as applied to the recognition of the Government of France.

The dangers that Mr. Burke would apprehend if Algiers were in our neighbourhood, could not possibly arise from recognizing that State, but from the intercourse that might exist between its subjects and his Majesty's. But the act of recognizing a Government does not imply permission of unrestrained intercourse. Were Algiers our neighbour, it might be the purpose of a negotiation to limit or restrain the intercourse between the two countries, if both of them apprehended that without limitation or restriction it would be dangerous: If only one of them entertained this apprehension, negotiation would be unnecessary, because the Legislature of that one, as long as it maintained its independence, might adopt measures as strong and efficacious as any circumstances could require. Most if not all of the Governments of Europe do now actually regulate or restrain, as seems best to them, the intercourse between their subjects and the subjects of other States, of those even with which they are in the strictest amity. The French Republic will surely never attempt to dictate to us measures of internal police; to tell us that we must admit amongst us such and as many of her citizens as

may

think proper to visit or reside in our Island, or if she does no minister of the Majesty of Great Britain will ever comply with her insolence.

~~It is not the recognition but the refusal to make recognition of a State that can be attended with danger. Why is it prudent for Ministers to recognize and negotiate with the Government of Algiers? Because they obtain from it a forbearance of piracy. But if for this reason it is prudent to recognize and negotiate with the robbers of Algiers, who can prosecute their depredations on our property, with but a few and those miserably armed vessels, and who with their whole force could not expect to conquer and keep possession of the weakest of our colonies; would it not be imprudent, nay even downright madness to refuse to recognize and negotiate with the robbers of France, (if indeed the French Government be a Government of robbers) who can prosecute their depredations on our property with fifty ships of the line, and six times that number of stout frigates and privateers of their own, and with fifty other ships of the line, and three or four times that number of frigates and privateers which they have either forced or persuaded their friends to arm against us; who would probably capture a thousand of our merchantmen, in the same time that the Algerine robbers could take a score; who with much short of their whole force, could conquer or destroy our most flourishing Colonies,~~

and who in the arrogance and audacity of their presumptuous imaginations, have even dared to meditate the conquest of the Empire itself? Would it be prudent to avoid a wasp and encounter a tyger? to soothe the anger of a mischievous dwarf, and rouse the rage of a ferocious giant?

Since then it is a measure of prudence, and according to the practice of the best times of English dignity, not an act of dishonor, to recognize and negotiate with the Government of Algiers, it is much more strongly a measure of prudence, and in the same degree consistent with national honor to recognize and negotiate with the Government of the French Republic, admitting that it consists of such infamous robbers and murderers as compose the Government of Algiers. The precedent quoted from the Algerine reports is therefore, (with admissions most severe and unfavourable on the part of the case to which it is applied) of full and decisive authority. On this ground therefore let the rule obtained to shew cause why his Majesty should not recognize and negotiate with the French Republic be made absolute.

Viewing the present and the former state of the powers of Europe, do we find that any one of them has lost by recognizing or gained by refusing to recognize the Government of the French Republic? Not the late Sovereign of Russia, certainly,

tainly, for she might have possessed herself of Poland with the same facility, and perhaps with better grace and more consistency of character, had she maintained the most friendly correspondence with the robber and exterminator Robespierre. Has Denmark, or free America, or Prussia or Hanover lost any thing by recognizing the French Republic? Has the late King of Sardinia, or the Duke of Wettemburgh, or any other Potentate of Europe, gained any thing by refusing to recognize and negotiate with that Republic?

The wish of Mr. Burke that the Governments of Europe should not acknowledge the present Government of France, and that they should continue the war until that Government is destroyed, proceeds, I am fully persuaded, from as pure and noble motives as can actuate the human heart. He has been led to think that that Government is guilty of every crime, turpitude, and oppression towards its subjects, whose deliverance from what he calls the vilest and severest tyranny that ever scourged the earth, as well as the punishment of their tyrants, is among the great ends which he purposes to accomplish by continuing the war. Without entering for the present into the question of our ability to punish the supposed oppressors of France, it must be confessed that Mr. Burke, informed as he has been, entertains

generous purposes. What purpose more virtuous and noble than to deliver the oppressed? But we have good reason to know that with regard to the affairs of France, this gentleman has been egregiously deceived. From many and important events of universal notoriety, it must appear as ridiculous as impolitic to continue the war any longer in order to punish the Government of France for oppressing her people. The people of France have not only not solicited us to deliver them from any oppression, or to punish their supposed oppressors, but they have themselves punished most severely all who have attempted to do either. Supposing then that the wickedness and the tyranny of the present rulers of France are as odious and oppressive as Mr. Burke's information induces him to believe, the people of France highly deserve whatever they may suffer, for having treated with such rudeness and ingratitude all the armies which the allies have ever sent for their deliverance. Let us therefore abandon this ungrateful people to the mercy of their Government; let us no longer punish ourselves, nor even subject ourselves to the slightest inconvenience to emancipate the one or punish the other, and let no oppression that may be exercised upon persons who are so willing to endure oppression, retard for one moment the re-establishment of tranquillity in England.

Your

Your Grace will undoubtedly have observed that in proving, if I have indeed proved, the propriety of recognizing and negotiating with the most wicked and infamous Governments, I have performed much more than my case required. Desirous of completely refuting Mr. Burke's arguments against recognizing the Republic of France, I have hitherto admitted the principal facts on which he founds them. But I have admitted a great deal too much. The present Government of France is far from being of the infamous character which Mr. Burke describes.

To have negotiated with such infernal monsters as Hebert, Marat, Chaumette and Robespierre, might, possibly, have been unsafe and dishonourable to his Majesty. It might at least be contended that ministers were in some degree excusable, in being unable to make such a sacrifice of their feelings to their duty, as such recognition and negotiation would have required. But, this admitted, it would nevertheless have been unwise and even dishonourable to have refused to negotiate with the members of the Directory; unwise for various reasons besides those which I have already given; and dishonourable because it would be false and unjust to class these men, insolent and presumptuous as they are, with the vile and execrable ruffians, whose sanguinary domination so long

long afflicted France. Some indeed of her present rulers were of the number of those ruffians; but they have in some measure expiated their guilt by reforming their conduct. Tallien, for instance, was foremost among those who hurled Roberespierre from his "Throne of Terror," and established what in comparison with his rule, is the reign of humanity and mercy. But whatever number of the old may have place in the composition of the new Government, there is certainly a very great difference between its spirit and character and the spirit and character of its predecessor. Do we now hear of any thing to remind us of those massacres which "cannot be remembered without horror," except the punishment of the perpetrators? Do the present rulers of France maintain themselves by proscriptions, exiles, and confiscations without number? Do they now carry fire and sword through La Vendée? Have they not faithfully observed the conditions of their agreements with the brave inhabitants of that desolated territory? Are they not entitled to a portion of our regards for restoring liberty to such of our countrymen as the perfidious and pusillanimous tyrant, without right or expediency, had consigned to his dungeons; for mitigating the captivity of those whose imprisonment was unavoidable from the fortune and the laws of war, and for delivering from death the myriads of their own nation, whose blood

blood was soon to have diminished the fears or gratified the vengeance of their oppressors?

In almost every respect the ruling persons of the New Government are diametrically opposite to the Jacobin* Faction. They encourage with a zeal that the worst of their enemies must esteem

* I use the word Jacobin, and perhaps correctly, in the sense in which it is now and has been for upwards of two years understood in the place where the term originated. To avoid a disgusting and hideous enumeration of crimes and absurdities, I define jacobinism to be the system of politics adopted by the Jacobin Club of Paris from the year 1793 to the time of its destruction, and acted upon in various places by Le Bon, Freron, Collot d'Herbois, Carrier, Marat and Robespierre. By jacobinism I mean that system "which drenched France with blood, and inundated it with tears; proscribed probity, virtue and philosophy; annihilated commerce, arts and sciences; honoured vandalism and robbery; corrupted moral principle; delegated the power of life and death to the most ferocious of men; erected 50,000 bastiles, and filled them with pretended conspirators; massacred age on its bed of pain; murdered infancy in the mother's womb; violated chastity in the moment of death; fattened the monsters of the ocean with human flesh; changed the Rhone and the Loire to rivers of blood, Vancluse to a fountain of tears, Nantes to a sepulchre, Paris, Arras, Bourdeaux, Strasbourg to slaughter-houses, and France to one vast theatre of horror, pillage, and murder." When, therefore, I speak of jacobinism, I cannot allude to any thing English. There is nothing in England like it. Instead of 80,000 Jacobins I do not believe the country contains one.

laudable,

laudable, the improvement of the arts and sciences; not those only which administer to the art of war, but all which can supply instruction or afford delight to men. Their projected establishments for the education of youth merit the attention and imitation of every Government in the world. Their manners, still more than their morals, are remote from jacobin usage. They have laid aside that barbarous grossness of language which was once esteemed an essential part of the accomplishments of a republican, but which no prince would be pleased to have addressed to his Ambassador. The squalid and sordid apparel that was once displayed with such ludicrous and grotesque vanity is no longer in the mode of Paris. The ministers and senators of the French Republic have long thought that there is no necessary connexion, and indeed nothing congenial, between dirt and patriotism; between rags and liberty.— Were your Grace now to visit Paris in a diplomatic capacity, the benevolence of your mind would not be afflicted with the relation of any but former atrocities; you would not see one person brought to the guillotine (or as the exterminators facetiously expressed it, “ peeping through the little national window”) for the promulgation of opinions; you would be led into apartments as splendid as any in Burlington-house; you would be introduced to a gentleman wearing as handsome robes

robes as your own, who would speak to you politely and call you by your title, without once assuring you that your illustrious master was a crowned robber; that your countrymen were a pack of stupid and execrable slaves, or that things would never go on well in England until your Grace and all the rest of our nobility were strangled with the bowels of all our priests*, and the management of our affairs confided to some worthy gentlemen of Wapping or St. Giles's, whom they in their goodness would recommend us to elect. No such insulting language would be addressed to your Grace. Whatever might be the lofty and unreasonable demands of the Directory, they would not be made in the style of the Pere Duchesne. You would be treated as a gentleman and respected as the representative of a sovereign power. You would find among the members of the French Government, some men of splendid talents and extensive reputation, whose acquaintance it would not disgrace your Lordship or any other person in Europe to cultivate.

From this reception of your Grace as ambassador to the French Republic, could any dishonour

* It was a saying of one of the Jacobins (I believe of Anacharsis Cloots, surnamed the orator of the human race) that no good would be done in the world until the last of kings was strangled with the bowels of the last of priests.

attach to your Grace or your country? Have ministers merited the bitter censures of Mr. Burke for advising his Majesty to recognize that republic? In its present circumstances would not they have been inexcusable if they had still refused to recognize it?

Some are of opinion that his Majesty's Ministers would have acted unwisely and ignominiously, if they had made any treaty with the French nation whilst it was subject to the dominion of the Jacobin club. They who maintain this opinion frequently argue thus: "The Jacobin Government of France was composed of men who were not likely, (any set of them) according to fair probabilities, to enjoy their power or even their lives for six weeks; who, if guillotined, would most probably have been succeeded by others that would act upon a new political system, regardless of the engagements of their predecessors or the faith of their nation; and who, if continued, and extraordinary acts of wickedness had prolonged their tyranny, were such fickle and perfidious barbarians that no good conjecture could have been made of their own future political measures, and no fair hope entertained that they would remain faithful to their own engagements any longer than it suited their convenience or caprice:—To have made peace with France, in these circumstances, would have been

been insanity; We could not have expected that the greedy ruffians by whom she was governed, would have been able to resist long the temptation of the rich booty which our extensive commerce would have continually offered to their view, and frequently placed within their grasp; or even that they would have delayed the renewal of hostilities beyond the first opportunity of capturing one of our commercial fleets. Peace in these circumstances might have been much more detrimental to us than war. The war establishment must have been kept up, unless we had been willing to have trusted the safety of our wealthy empire to the mercy and good faith of the most merciless and perfidious, or to the imbecility of the most powerful banditti that ever oppressed or afflicted mankind. Our expence would therefore have been nearly as great during a Jacobin peace as in war, without yielding to us any return in conquests or booty, and our loss by captures might have been much greater in consequence of having made peace than if the war had been continued. The confidence which is always inspired by a treaty of peace, would have made our merchants venture their property upon the ocean without the protection which they would have required in war; and through this confidence the Jacobin pirates might have made richer captures, after a short interval of peace, than they could have made in a year,

had there been no interruption of war. To have concluded a peace with these vile banditti, without humbling or punishing them, would have been as ignominious as unwise: for they constantly lavished upon his Majesty (the representative to foreign nations of the dignity of our own) the foulest and grossest reproaches: and if his Majesty, instead of being an ornament to the most splendid throne in the world, had been the vilest of men, he was still the King whom the English people supported and obeyed, and they would have been base and pusillanimous if they had suffered him to be insulted with impunity, since their own dignity and consequence, in the eyes of foreign States, were centered in his person. To repress this confederacy was the interest of the majority of every country. That confederacy openly avowed their design, not merely to change forms of Government, but to assist the desperate and wicked few of every country in plundering and enslaving all the rest. It was peculiarly our interest to repress Jacobinism, and if possible annihilate its spirit, if we felt any affection for the portion of democracy which we enjoyed. True Jacobin principles which might possibly have gained a footing in this island if we had made peace with France whilst they were triumphant, are most averse to democratic principles. The Jacobin Government was a confederation of Oligarchies. Its powers were chiefly

chiefly exercised by the Jacobin Club, the great oligarchy of the city of Paris, supported by the desperate energy of the clubs or oligarchies that were established in every part of France. Free election was unknown. The trial by jury, the liberty of speech and of the press, privileges watched with such jealousy by the democracy of England, were annihilated. Talents, virtues and reputation, which are idolized in almost every democracy, were capital crimes during the Jacobin usurpation. None of the characteristics of democracy were to be found in this Government. It abhorred and dreaded real democrats above all others. Every class of persons in this country, and above all the republicans, the advocates for popular sovereignty, were interested in destroying the power and influence of the Jacobin Government. That the continuance of the war occasioned events which accelerated its fall, and rendered more complete the destruction of its principles, no one can seriously doubt. If peace would have suffered it to continue for any considerable length of time, and peace might have had this effect since it would not have permitted the atrocious acts by which the Jacobins ruined themselves, then France and England, and every country in Europe, but France more than all, should rejoice that hostilities were not interrupted.—But we were at peace with Algiers, whose

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Government was as abominable and infamous as the Jacobin Government of France ; admitted. But the governors of Algiers had not arrived at Jacobin insolence. They had not published through the world that his Majesty was a crowned robber or a royal butcher. They were not possessed of sufficient impudence to reproach others with their own crimes. Robbers they were, indeed, and ministers acknowledged them as a lawful Government. But although these ministers were willing to speak civilly to the mischievous dwarf, whose punishment would have cost the country much trouble without affording any great advantage or renown, they disdained to flatter the insulting giant, from whom if more danger were to be apprehend, more glory was to be won."

With whatever force such arguments as these might have been urged against treating for peace with France during the despotism of the Jacobin oligarchy, not one of them will bear application to France in her present circumstances. The actual Government of France has given, during upwards of two years past, as good proof of its stability and permanency as ought to be required of any Government in any times, particularly in such times of change and uncertainty as these. That Government adheres steadily to one system; and

and has assumed a respectable, although a haughty character. It utters no gross and vulgar invectives against the persons of any kings, or against any forms of government; it has abandoned the destructive design of imposing its own political principles upon all other nations, and is as inveterately the enemy of Jacobin principles as any Government in Europe.

Although the negotiations for peace are unfortunately broken off, our formal recognition of the French Republic will be attended with considerable advantages to us. Our conduct has proved to the people of France that we have no intention of meddling in their internal affairs; no design of prescribing to them any mode of religion, or any form of Government. We have not merely acknowledged the actual Government of France, as we might have done although we at the same time meditated or prepared for its destruction; We have recognized, most fully and formally, the system on which it is founded. We have by this measure declared our acquiescence in the French Revolution. We have disclaimed that our purpose in continuing the war is the restoration of the French monarchy. We have informed the people of France that as far as we are concerned their political system is safe. They may certainly rest assured that his Majesty will never be guilty of

of the inconsistency and duplicity of retracting what he has once publicly said, and of acting in violation of what he has done, solemnly and in the presence of the whole world. The French Republic being thus securely established, the tremendous enthusiasm of the French people, which arose out of the attempts to prevent them from establishing a Republican Government, will be damped if not destroyed. It cannot long exist in its full vigor after the causes to which it owed its origin have ceased to operate. This main spring of the martial prosperity and glory of the French Republic, derived all its strength from the magnitude of the dangers that threatened her existence, and cannot retain its pristine force after the formal recognition of her authority by all her enemies. The zeal of her people must be considerably abated when they are no longer menaced with a form of Government which they detest, and when this recognition must make them feel secure of the establishment of the system of Government which they have spilled so much of their blood to maintain. The enemy can now continue the war for no other objects than extension of territory, and of commerce; objects that a whole people can never be made to pursue with the same enthusiasm which they would display in defence of their national independence, or of a favorite political system. His Majesty's wisdom in acknowledging
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the French Republic may not only abate her enthusiasm, but rouse and animate the whole English nation. The same uses that occasioned in France those mighty exertions that have no parallel in the history of the world, would operate I trust in Great Britain with equal power. If it should ever appear that our enemies prosecute the war for the purpose of destroying our sovereign independence, or of subverting any religious or political establishment that we wish to maintain, or imposing upon us any systems or establishments that we abominate, I trust there would spring up amongst us a national enthusiasm of such fervor and energy, as to justify the expectation that our exertions would even surpass the hitherto unexampled exertions of the enemy.

If ministers followed the advice of Mr. Burke, in never acknowledging the French Republic, we could never prosecute the war against her with enthusiasm, nor would her zeal against us ever be diminished. The spirit of the people of England would be deadened by the opinion, which it would be impossible to prevent them from entertaining, that their blood and treasure were wasted to gratify the obstinate pride of their Government, and the spirit of the people of France would be buoyed up to its highest pitch by the consideration which

their rulers would continually press, that our refusal to acknowledge their Government was evidence of a project for its destruction.

The mode in which we have recognized the French Republic appears to Mr. Burke imprudent, and not justified by any example". "I doubt" says he "upon mere temporary considerations of "prudence whether it (the formal recognition of "that State) was perfectly advisable. It is not "within the rules of dexterous conduct to make "an acknowledgment of a contested title in your "enemy, before you are morally certain that "your recognition will secure his friendship. "Otherwise it is a measure worse than thrown "away. It adds infinitely to the strength and "consequently to the demands of the adverse "party. He has gained a fundamental point "without an equivalent †."

In the unconditional recognition of the French Republic, ministers were perfectly authorised by the example of the American war. The United States of America were recognized in the first instance and without stipulation, condition or equivalent by a minister whom Mr. Burke then

* Page 36. + Ibid.

* Page 36,

† Ibid.

supported*. But the unconditional acknowledgment of the French Republic is certainly a measure of much clearer propriety. In recognizing our late colonies as Sovereign States, his Majesty relinquished an undoubted claim of his own, and attributed to them a title to sovereign power, which, according to the established law of nations, this recognition was absolutely necessary to render complete. Previous to it, the formal

* The following passage is extracted from a speech of Mr. Burke's, as it appears in Debrett's Report of one of the Debates of the House of Commons on our acknowledgment of the United States of America.

" There were three opinions in this country on the great and " important question of American independence; they might " each of them appear reasonable and upright; he would not " pretend to decide upon either of them. The first of the three " was that independence to America under any considerations or " conditions was a real misfortune to this nation. This idea " might prevail with some men of every description in that " house; and he was sorry that it consisted of those of all " descriptions. He should not pretend to refute it. The next " was that independence ought not to be granted to America " without an equivalent of some nature or other as the price of " peace, or for something beneficial to this country. The last " was that it should be given up without any consideration of any " sort, that the recognition of it by this country should be free " and unlimited. *Amongst the last class was himself and his friend,*"

Vide Debrett's Parl. Reg. Vol. IX, page 79, 80.

acknowledgment of the American States by any other power would have amounted to a declaration of hostilities against his Majesty. In recognizing the French Republic his Majesty has relinquished no claim of his own, nor has he attributed to that State any title, rank or authority which would not have been complete and acknowledged by other powers without his recognition. How has it added to the strength or the demands of the enemy? It has indeed given him an assurance that we do not war against his independence; but it has given nothing more. It has added, not to his, but to our strength. It will place us in any future negotiation on higher, because on juster grounds. We had no more right to demand from the enemy an equivalent for our recognition of his system of Government than he had to demand of the absolute Princes, our allies, a compensation for recognizing their sovereign rights when he repealed his decrees of fraternity. Are we sure that the Directory would not have smiled in derision if they had been seriously asked by our ambassador how much they were willing to give his Majesty as an equivalent for recognizing the French Republic? As an equivalent, they might have said, for acknowledging the existence of a State that had made almost all her enemies tremble for their own.

Between independent nations, the only sort of equivalent that can be reasonably expected for the acknowledgment of one title is, the acknowledgment of some other. If two States quarrel, and if each refuses to recognize the title which the other has assumed, it would not be consistent with the dignity of either of them to yield the point of title to the adversary, without being first assured of receiving from him a similar concession. If the Government of France had refused to acknowledge his Majesty as King of Great Britain, ministers would have been blameable in recognizing their authority without demanding as an equivalent the formal acknowledgment of his Majesty's title. But as they have never denied it, there was nothing that we could have justly demanded from them in return for the recognition which his Majesty has made.

The next of the propositions in which I have endeavoured to include the substance of Mr. Burke's letters is, "that if we make peace with the present Government of France, this country will not long be able to preserve her religion, property, constitution or laws, and that the whole system of religion, laws, government, usages, morals and manners now established in Europe will be destroyed."

It is extraordinary that the apprehensions which were at one time entertained from the revolutionary principle, should still remain in any man's mind undiminished, since they have not been justified by a single event. Not one revolution has been effected in the world since the revolution in France, by the mere force or fascination of her principles. The revolution in Poland had no connexion with them, and it is notorious that the change of Government which has taken place in the Netherlands, the United Provinces, Savoy, and in some parts of Germany and Italy, was effected chiefly, if not altogether, by the armies of France. Even the revolution in Geneva is much less imputable to French doctrines, than to French power and French gold. All these were found insufficient, during the Jacobin reign, to produce a revolution in the feeble republic of Genoa, not to mention the republics of Venice and the American States. But surely the danger that was not then fatal to Venice or Genoa, can never be formidable to the British Empire. It is fair to presume at least that the fears of many persons from the operation of the revolutionary principle are too great, since experience has not yet confirmed them in any one instance, and in one only if the Republic of Geneva furnishes an exception to my proposition.

Mr.

Mr. Burke is apprehensive for the safety of the Christian religion, because France, as he asserts, is governed by fanatical Atheists, who have made "atheism by establishment" one of the bases of the French Republic.

Atheism cannot justly be said to be established by any State, unless it is professed by that State, or by its representative in some solemn declaration. To neglect acknowledging the existence of God, is not to establish atheism. The word establishment implies some positive regulation. Far from having made atheism one of their establishments, the Legislators of the French Republic have recognized the existence and the providence of the Supreme Being, in their most solemn act and in the most solemn language. The very first paragraph of the first and most important chapter of their Constitution, the declaration of rights and duties, is dedicated to this acknowledgment. It is made in the following words: "The French people proclaim, in the presence of the SUPREME BEING, the following declaration of the rights and duties of man and of a citizen." In addition to this solemn recognition of the fundamental principle of religion, the same declaration asserts, that "no man is a good man if he is not frankly and religiously an observer of the laws;" and what is still more important and decisive, the 354th

article

article of the Constitution provides that "no man can be hindered from exercising the form of worship that he has chosen, whilst he conforms to the laws." Thus the French Legislators have established atheism, by making a solemn acknowledgment of the existence and providence of the Deity, the preliminary to their constitutional law, and by securing in the most forcible and irrevocable provision they had power to make, the right of every man to acknowledge and adore that Being, in whatever mode, and with whatever rites and ceremonies his conscience might suggest. If atheism is established in the French Republic it is also established in the Republic of America. No particular form of worship is maintained in either of those States at the public expence.

Were atheism actually made one of the bases of the French Republic, we should justly regard her with horror, and account the ignorance, ingratitude and mental abasement of her Legislators as degrading to human nature. Their conduct would be too detestable to be contagious. Of all vicious opinions, atheism contains the least infection. It holds out no temptations: it presents no object for hope, the universal passion: it is a melancholy subterfuge from fear. There are few who would not fly for refuge into the arms of the vilest and grossest superstition rather than encounter the terrors

terrors of annihilation by embracing the Atheist's creed.

It is unfortunate for the credit of Mr. Burke that he continually accuses the revolutionists of crimes which are incompatible with each other. He not only refuses to allow that they possess any virtue, but he will not admit that they are free from any vice. Those whom in one place he reproaches with *atheism*, with denying the existence of God, he accuses in another of being "*rebels to God*," of perfectly abhorring the author of their being, of hating him with all their heart, with all their mind, with all their soul, with all their strength; of having a delight, as they are not able to revenge themselves on God, in vicariously defacing, degrading, torturing and tearing in pieces his image in man*. Such accusations are not only unworthy of the enlightened philosopher Edmund Burke, but they would be too coarse, blasphemous, extravagant and disgusting to be made by John Bunyan or Rowland Hill.

It cannot be pleasing to the sincere Christian to hear how Mr. Burke explains his apprehensions for the fate of Christianity. "Example," says he, "is the school of mankind and they will learn

* Page, 161.

"at no other. This war is a war against that example. It is not a war for Louis XVIII. or even for the property, virtue, fidelity of France: It is a war for George III. for Francis II. and for all the dignity, property, honor, virtue and religion of England, of Germany and of all Nations." Is then, the Christian religion, like all the superstitions that now exist among the barbarous, nations and those that were prevalent in the antient world, learnt only from example; believed only because others believe it, and publicly embraced by us only because it is established? Is it so feeble, so entirely dependant upon human circumstances that it can be overthrown by any example whatever? If it were even destitute of the divine protection, its very nature, as an intellectual system, would secure it from being destroyed by force or by mere example. It is a religion of the mind; a religion of opinions, doctrines and precepts: It teaches rights and duties; it arrests and keeps possession of the mind by hope and terror: its temples are the heart and the understanding: it therefore can not be mortally assaulted (admitting it to be a mere human system) except with intellectual weapons. The religions of antiquity had no solid foundation in the mind: they were therefore capable of being destroyed by force or by example. When the Temples and Priests of an heathen deity were destroyed, his worship, consisting entirely of

of ceremonies, to the performance of which temples and Priests were necessary, must soon have ceased, and his votaries have been compelled to find another object of adoration. It was on this account that the ancient superstitions were so easily and so completely exterminated. But the Christian religion was never yet destroyed in any country where it had once firmly taken root; where it had ever been generally known and embraced as a system of opinions, and not as a system of external rites. In spite of the sword and the oppressive tribute; in spite of tyranny, insolence and contempt; in spite of persecutions, imprisonments, robberies, banishments, disgrace, slavery and death; in a word, in spite of the whole force and the example of the Mahometan Governments of Asia, exerted during a long period with fanatical fury and perseverance for the destruction of our religion, it is still, and during all that period was the popular religion in most of the countries then and at this time subject to the Mahometan sway; and it would probably have now been equally prevalent in China, in Japan and in other Eastern Nations, if it had been introduced amongst them in its true intellectual shape, and not as a collection of ceremonies, which physical power could always destroy. Can we reasonably apprehend that the mere example of France will operate more powerfully to the detriment of the Christian religion on the minds of the free, independent

dent, bold, obstinate Englishmen, than force and example, fire and sword, tribute and ignominy have ever done upon the minds of the feeble, timid and enslaved Asiatics?

If any formidable attack can be made against our religion, it must be made with argument, or with something that resembles argument. During the last and the present centuries, such attacks were often made; but they were always vigorously repulsed. In France indeed they were more successful than in any part of Europe; and there they were undoubtedly assisted by the revolution. But in England and in most of the other countries of Europe, the Christian church is now militant very nearly in the same posture in which she would have stood if the French revolution had not happened. I trust we shall never form our opinions concerning the Christian religion from what has happened, or what may happen in France or in any other country, but from its merit as a moral system, and from the evidence transmitted to us by our ancestors of its divine original.

The property of this country has as little to dread as her religion from the infection of French principles, or the influence of French example. Many and unjust confiscations were made within our view, before the era of the French revolution, with-

without disturbing the rights of property. I should not indeed apprehend any danger to property in this country, if the Jacobin confiscations still continued, and if daily robberies and murders were now perpetrated in France as they were during Robespierre's tyranny. I trust we should view them with the deepest abhorrence, and that in place of exciting us to similar guilt, they would render us more zealous in the protection of property and life.

Robbery and murder have not much more power of fascinating the mass of mankind than atheism. Many indeed may wish, although few will have the shameless audacity to declare, that they are willing to imitate the successful plunderer. But no extensive robbery, such as Mr. Burke apprehends, can ever be committed without a very extensive combination, and a full declaration and confession of the views of the combining parties. I am persuaded it would not be possible to find within this kingdom, granting liberal permission to canvass, such a number of men as would be sufficient to destroy the rights of property, who would also be inclined to do so, and barefaced enough to avow their guilty inclination. I have a better opinion of the people of England than Mr. Burke. I do not believe they are so prone to plundering, that they only want the
revival

revival of Jacobinism in France to make them begin their depredations.

Property seems perfectly secure in England, because a great majority of the people are interested and believe themselves to be interested in its preservation. There is hardly an Englishman, possessed of a cottage or an acre of land, who does not know that he would be in danger of losing the cottage or the land if his wealthy neighbour could be plundered with impunity.

Whatever may be the operation of foreign example upon Great Britain, and whatever example, unfavorable to the rights of property, France may have hitherto given, she does not now, and probably will not in future, afford any farther encouragement to unlawful confiscation. Her rulers, having acquired for themselves and the State, so much of the wealth of the proscribed orders, will naturally endeavour to render it secure. But it can possess no security except what it enjoys in common with all other property. If confiscations were still encouraged or permitted, it would be impossible to restrain the depredations of the confiscators to particular portions of property. The confiscators of France and those who claim under their acts, should be uncommonly strict in securing to every man his possessions. They should

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compensate for the doubtfulness of their own titles by a rigorous support of all titles whatever. On Mr. Burke's supposition that all their confiscations have been acts of robbery, they must consider that they are liable to have their own example turned against themselves; they must therefore be careful that no future robbery however minute may be unpunished; and they must watch with unceasing vigilance, and oppose with the most rigorous severity any attempts, however feeble, at establishing any new system of plundering on a large scale. He would be a highwayman of wretched intellects who, having acquired a handsome fortune by his depredations, should suffer his zeal for his profession so far to get the better of his prudence, as to make him encourage depredations in future. If he were not miserably ignorant of his own interest, he would wish that no more robberies should ever be committed in the world; he would advise in opposition to the Jacobin doctrine that all titles to property should be maintained, without looking too minutely or too far back into their origin; and he would admire above all things the anti-revolutionary principle of our statute of limitations.

Whatever the cause of it may be, the fact is, that since the death of Robespierre few confiscations have been made in France, except what were made

made most justly of the property of many of his accomplices. Judicial robbery, like judicial murder, can never long be an established system in a country where the voice of the people is heard. In France indeed it formed the chief part of the system of Robespierre's Government during many months. But as every one living began to think himself interested in the cessation of judicial murder, so every one that possessed any property, and chiefly all those who possessed the confiscated property, began to wish that no more judicial robberies should be committed. Opposition to the general will was vain, and the cause of justice and humanity was triumphant.

The apprehension that the establishment of the French Republic will endanger the safety of our constitution, I take to be wholly unfounded. The form of the new French Constitution, and the leading principles on which it is established, have a strong resemblance to the form and the leading principles of the Constitution of Great Britain; and the whole history of France since her revolution affords very specious if not triumphant arguments to the advocates of those principles. In addition to the testimony that experience had given in their favor, previous to the fall of the French monarchy, it has since furnished more convincing proofs of their merit, at which their admirers might

might rejoice if those proofs had not been drawn from human sufferings.

There was indeed a period during the progress of the French Revolution, when there was perhaps, some reason to fear that the fascinating novelty of the principles then prevalent in France might shake those on which our Constitution is built. Even at that time many persons of good information held the danger light. They supposed that the principles of our Constitution were rooted, like those of religion, in our minds; and that no principles of Government however shewy or splendid, and no example of their effect on the condition of any foreign nation, could induce the people of this Island to adopt them in preference to the political principles which they had so long loved, and revered, and to which their attachment would be rendered invincible by inveterate prejudice and national vanity. But the French revolution has neither exhibited any events nor established any system that could destroy the principles of our Constitution, if instead of being zealously attached to them, we were determined to maintain them no longer than till France should supply us with new ones.

In the first period of that revolution, the French Legislators formed a Constitution which vested the

executive power in a King; and the legislative in that King and one assembly. In form and principles this Constitution differed widely from ours. It lasted but a short time; and was followed by another that was founded on principles of the widest democracy, and that differed still more than its predecessor from our political system, the legislative authority being no entrusted to one assembly, and the executive power to a council that was entirely dependent on its caprice. Although this Constitution was not put into activity, France had a tolerable specimen of what it might have been from the Convention, which exercised the powers of Government nearly in the same manner that it would have done if it had been the Legislative Assembly of Robespierre's Constitution. Every thing happened that the advocates of the principles of our Constitution would point out as likely to take place when the legislative and executive functions are exercised by one uncontested assembly. Laws were decreed and repealed with precipitation and caprice; the least opposition to the prevailing party was punished as treason against the State; the freedom of speech and of the press was destroyed; in a word tyranny was exercised in every shape. At length have the revolutionists of France, who from the year 1792, set out with enthusiastic attachment to absolute unlimited, unrestricted democracy; with abhorrence

to the principle that property should be an essential part of the qualification for suffrage; with contempt for our Constitution in all its parts; our two legislative assemblies; our vigorous and splendid executive power; our restriction of the right of suffrage; at length have these enthusiasts abandoned all their old political theories, and recognized the leading principles, and adopted the chief forms of the English Constitution. Like us they have limited the right of suffrage; they have established two legislative assemblies, Tribunals that are independent, and a vigorous and splendid executive power. Can any thing be more favorable or more flattering to our Constitution than thus to have its leading principles adopted, through conviction of their expediency, by their greatest enemies?

On a close examination of the Constitution, with the framers of which his Majesty was advised to negotiate, it appears not only to be founded on principles congenial to those of the English Constitution, but to be framed throughout as nearly in the same shape as the hatred of France to her old Government, and various other circumstances would permit. In some instances the restrictions of the right of suffrage, both in respect to age and property, are more numerous and more severe in the new French Constitution than in ours. No French Citizen has the right of voting for a mem-

ber of either of the Legislative Councils, unless he is 25 years of age, and is in possession of a property equivalent in some districts to seven pounds, and in others to fourteen pounds sterling per annum. The Legislative authority is vested in two councils, or houses according to our phrase. Citizens under the age of 40 years are excluded from the Council of Ancients; and after the seventh year of the Republic, no person under the age of 30 years will be competent to be a member of the Council of Five Hundred.

This qualification excludes from the Legislature an immense portion of the democracy. By our laws twenty one years give the age of competency for a seat in either House of Parliament. The French Constitution does not indeed require the Legislators to possess considerable property: But it is not likely that the electors, who must themselves have property, will choose for representatives men who have none; that they will vest legislative power with those whose necessities might tempt them to make too free with the purses of their constituents. I think it may be fairly presumed that the operation of all these qualifications, particularly the qualification of age, will give to the future Government of the French Republic a sober, serious and steady character; a character incompatible with a disposition to encourage wild and wicked revolutionary projects.

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The French Constitution has given the executive authority to a council of five persons, who are vested with high powers and cloathed with little less than regal splendor. This council, called the Executive Directory, superintends the execution of the laws, the receipt and expenditure of the public money, and the ministry of all the municipal bodies: It disposes of the armed force by sea and land, receives Ambassadors, negotiates treaties, proposes peace and war, appoints and dismisses at pleasure all the ministers, generals, and a great number of the other public functionaries: it has its guards, its messengers of State and its ushers.—(Their dress would in some countries entitle them to be called *gentlemen ushers*.) Its members are lodged in splendid Palaces, arrayed in robes of State, addressed in the most respectful language, and received with the highest military honors. Its relation to the Legislative Assemblies bears a strong resemblance to that which exists in practice between his Majesty and both Houses of Parliament. If the Directory have no legislative voice, his Majesty never exerts the legislative authority bestowed upon him by our Constitution, but in sanctioning the decrees of our two Legislative Assemblies. The Directory have not the full power of declaring war. It can not be declared but by a decree of the Legislative Body upon the formal proposition of the Directory*.

* Article 526 of the new French Constitution.

With us the same forms are observed; for although the Royal Prerogative authorises his Majesty to declare war in the first instance, he is always pleased to send a message to both Houses of Parliament, whenever he thinks that war is necessary, and with their approbation and concurrence he never engages the country in any contest whatever. Treaties made by the executive Directory with Foreign powers are not valid until they are ratified by the Legislature. His Majesty can indeed by virtue of his prerogative make treaties to bind his subjects; but the same gracious regard to the wishes and opinions of the Nation, that he always manifests previous to a declaration of war, never suffers him to conclude any treaty, until his Ministers, having felt the pulse of Parliament, can assure him that the treaty will meet with its approbation. In some circumstances, apparently of no great importance, our political modes are exactly copied by the Republican Legislators. They have constructed the very galleries of their assemblies in conformity with ours. What the discretion of the speakers of our Houses of Parliament has observed in the admission of auditors into those assemblies, has been adopted in France, and secured with the force and solemnity of a constitutional article*.

* Article 64 provides that the sittings of both Councils shall be public; but that the persons who attend can not exceed the number of one half of the members of each Council.

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This is the political system, (excellent, I hope since it resembles our own) which Mr. Burke presumes to call *Jacobinism by establishment*.—This is the form of the Government that he has the effrontery to represent as a tumultuous military tyranny, and to compare, (but not without disparagement,) to the savage, sanguinary, and piratical despotism of Algiers. Is it possible that a State which has formed its Government on the model of the freest, wisest, and most moderate Government that until lately existed in the world, can merit the epithets, bloody, impious, abominable, perfidious?

I should have expected that Mr. Burke, instead of continuing to lavish invectives against the French Republic, would have beheld the establishment of her new Constitution with exultation, and that he would have triumphantly desired us to remark, how soon those Democrats who had issued flaming from the school of Rousseau, Paine and Barlow had been compelled to abandon the maxims of their preceptors; to give up their universal suffrage, their single Legislative Assembly, their feeble and dependent executive, with other important points of high democracy. I should have thought that Mr. Burke would not have ceased to urge the superiority of those principles of Government, whose advantages, he might say, had in two years overcome the prejudices of a numerous people,

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the enthusiasm of the most enthusiastic advocates of democracy, and the self-sufficiency and arrogance of the most self-sufficient and arrogant of men, the French philosophers: I should have expected that those philosophers would no longer have been obnoxious to his general and indiscriminate abuse; that whatever he might have still thought of their religious opinions, he would have been pleased, at their recovery from their political delirium, and that he would have congratulated them on having abandoned the guidance of imagination for the directions of sober judgment, and on having founded their Constitution not upon the illusions of theory, but upon the solid base of experience.

I confess, that as far as I could allow myself to judge, I was pleased at the establishment of that Constitution. Far from considering it as a Jacobin Constitution, I regarded it as a fabric built upon the tomb of Jacobinism, and hoped that it would for ever prevent the resurrection of that abominable system. The division and accurate discrimination of all the great powers of Government; the independency of the Tribunals; the two Legislative Assemblies; the strength of the Executive Authority; the severe qualifications of age: all these provisions seemed to me of peculiar utility in a Constitution intended for the French nation; to curb its flights,

to correct its levity; to moderate the violence of its passions; to restrain its rash precipitation; to protect unpopular minorities from the rage of the multitude; in short to prevent for ever the revival of those wild, extravagant, monstrous and despotic measures that were pursued by the Convention and that might have been adopted, perhaps in a less atrocious extent, if the Jacobin Constitution of 1793 had been firmly established. Some of those monstrous measures were, in my opinion, not more ruinous to France than terrible to Great Britain. As a British subject I therefore rejoiced at the establishment of that form of Government in France which would not permit such measures to be resumed.

The new Government of France has conducted itself as differently from its immediate predecessor, ever since it was put into action according to the provisions of the new Constitution, as to justify fully the expectations I had formed of the advantages of its structure. Some circumstances, it must be observed, have rendered those provisions much less efficacious than they will be after the lapse of a few years. The qualification of 30 years of age will not be required in the members of the Council of Five Hundred before the year 1799. This circumstance can have but little influence on the character of the French Govern-

ment, compared with the influence of the memorable decree for the re-election of the two-thirds of the Convention into the two Legislative Assemblies. Few will hesitate to admit that the predominance of the conventional members in the composition of the new Government is unfavorable to its moral character, and that it will probably have a stronger claim to our esteem, when the good sense of the people, and the provisions of the Constitution shall have expelled from the Legislature every September Assassin, and every accomplice in the crimes of Robespierre.

*Notwithstanding the decree of the two-thirds, the provisions of the new Constitution, aided by other causes, have completely changed the spirit and character of the French Government.**

** I have sometimes supposed that the decree of the two-thirds, like many other violent measures, was not altogether destitute of utility. If the people of France had been left perfectly free to choose their new Government, they would probably have elected Legislators whose very first legislative act might have been a decree of vengeance against most of their predecessors, and all the supporters of the Jacobin system. To punish their enormities would undoubtedly have been just; but rigid justice is not always expedient. The Jacobins were a numerous, united and vindictive confederacy, who, if rendered desperate by losing all hope of pardon, might have again thrown their country into disorder and distraction, and have retaliated on their enemies by further massacres.*

no longer tyrannical and despotic, because it is no longer of a simple form and uncontroled. The courts of justice are independent, and France is not desolated by those murdering gangs, the Revolutionary Tribunals: No proconsular tyrants scourge the departments: No system of robbery is established or proposed; nor is there any more encouragement given to robbery or revolt in the countries that are at peace with the Republic than in those that are at war. To repress these would have required more frequent and more terrible executions, which would have occasioned more frequent and more aggravated acts of vindictive atrocity. Thus might France have been for many years a scene of executions, massacres, and rancorous civil contentions. For the sake of all Europe I deprecate such events. We know from experience, that the hostility of France will be savage and destructive in proportion as her Government is sanguinary and tyrannical, and as her people are made ferocious by being familiarized with robberies, massacres, assassinations, executions, and all the other dreadful accompaniments of civil war. By the decree of the two-thirds the great body of the Jacobins have been protected from popular fury, and the people themselves may have been saved from the dreadful retaliation of Jacobin despair. A cessation is thus given to the mutual vengeance and retribution of parties. The Government, being purified by successive elections, will recede gradually from what it has been; and by the time that the legislative influence of the conventional members will have ceased, the violence of their enemies will be assuaged, their crimes will be remembered with less horror, and their Jacobin supporters will no longer be obnoxious to the rage of popular resentment.

her own dominions: No decrees of fraternity are made by her Legislators: No orator of the human race is permitted to propose to them, that every altar and every throne be levelled with the dust, and that every country in the world be annexed as a department to the French Republic. The present Government of France has itself been established on the overthrow of a seditious faction, which, notwithstanding its defeat, still meditates insurrection and aspires to empire; and the members of that Government know that they cannot excite universal revolt abroad without encouraging rebellion at home. They are therefore, as averse to high revolutionary principles as any statesmen in Europe. They have entirely abandoned the old system of confraternity. They have not established or encouraged the propagation of their political principles in any of the countries they have conquered, except in those which they meant to retain in their possession and form into departments, and those in which their encouragement of those principles facilitated their military operations. In these countries they employed their political principles merely as instruments of hostility. We cannot reproach an open enemy with availing himself of a formidable weapon. Who would not account that Government most stupid, who would spurn the proffered alliance of enthusiasm, and create enmity to their cause

cause and opposition to their projects, when they might secure zealous friendship and powerful co-operation. It would be as absurd to censure the French Generals for countenancing and assisting the Republicans of Flanders and Holland, as to blame our Commanders for countenancing and assisting the Royalists in Martinique and St. Domingo. France does not now, as Mr. Burke continually represents, exert her power to extend her principles: but she avails herself of her principles to aggrandize her power. She has long been extremely cautious of establishing them, (much more cautious than could have been expected from her former revolutionary zeal) except where they favor her projects of national ambition. In Piedmont, if the best sort of newspaper information may be depended on, the French General Buonaparte assisted the late King of Sardinia in quelling some disturbances among his subjects, and in punishing some vassals who had risen against their Lords. It is also said that this General discouraged all revolutionary proceedings in Lombardy, until the Emperor, having put an end to the truce which had subsisted between his armies and those of the French Republic on the Rhine, had declared his intention of continuing the war, for objects which France was unwilling to yield, and had thus occasioned her to form the design of annexing his Italian Dominions to her mighty

mighty Empire, or of modelling them into a separate Republic. The French Government appear to have been very dilatory and reluctant in changing the political system of Lombardy. Their journals avow the motives of their conduct. They are sensible of the energy of freedom, and they apprehend that the establishment of a popular Republic in the heart of Italy, might render that country one of their most formidable enemies. They are not merely indifferent, they are hostile to the extension of Republican principles beyond their own territory.

In Belgium, and the other conquered countries which they intended to form into departments and unite to France, they naturally established her political system. They would have acted most absurdly if they had suffered any of their provinces to have retained a form of Government entirely different from that of their empire. In Holland indeed, which they have not modelled into a department, they have effected a revolution by co-operating with the democratic party. But that party had been favorable to French politics ever since we had espoused the cause of the Stadholder, and would probably have been assisted by France if she had atchieved the conquest of Holland under the auspices and Government of Louis the Sixteenth. The enemy could never have drawn from

from Holland the advantages which that country has actually afforded to him since he subdued it, unless he had countenanced some party or other. The democrats, it is said, formed the strongest party. They were certainly the party most friendly to the conqueror, who desirous of making the most of his acquisition, fraternized with them, aided them in establishing their favorite system, and permitted them to regulate the Government of their country as they pleased, on condition of co-operating with him in his ambitious projects.

But what puts out of all doubt that the French Government are no longer possessed with the spirit of propagating democracy, is their conduct in the last campaign, whilst they were in possession of a portion of Germany, containing the territories of many absolute Princes. If they had been revolutionary zealots they would have then endeavoured to establish their revolutionary principles in those places; but it is notorious that they did not attempt to excite any revolution in any one of them; that they did not dethrone any Prince, untile any Nobleman, or unbefitice any Minister of religion. Their prudence has entirely overcome their zeal. They do not now, like Mahomet, make their invasions, the sword in one hand and their creed in the other, except where their creed will procure them some solid advantages. Experience has taught

taught them that the sword by itself is often more formidable. Some of their enemies are too ignorant and barbarous to be wrought upon by revolutionary principles. Mahomet had this advantage in propagating his system, that he could not find an enemy too barbarous to be his proselyte. The most ignorant and barbarous were the most likely to be influenced by extravagant hopes and terrors of an unknown world, and to receive his stupid ravings as the inspiration of heaven. But the principles of democracy implicate many complex and some highly refined ideas, neither suited to the taste, nor within the comprehension of the grossly ignorant*. In countries whose inhabitants are of

* Nothing is expressed in this proposition either favorable or hostile to democratic principles. The most absurd system may require cultivated intellects to comprehend and maintain it. Who ever embraced or defended atheism, that most absurd of all systems, but persons of some degree of acuteness? Mr. Jenkinson (now Lord Hawkesbury) made a just remark on this subject in the House of Commons, for which however he was reproved. He said "he laughed at the idea of democratic principles being prevalent in Russia and Poland. The people of these countries were too barbarous to receive them." I should wish to know how a revolutionist would make the vassal of a Russian Boyard comprehend that "a Republic is one and indissoluble;" that "the Sovereignty resides in the universality of the Citizens;" that "each Citizen delegates his portion of the sovereignty to his representative." I see no other method of gaining this vassal's hearty concurrence in any political scheme, but by convincing

this description, democracy cannot prevail, unless established and maintained by a force sufficient to keep them in complete subjection. The French Government are well acquainted with this. They do not now take the trouble to revolutionize barbarians: Solely intent upon national aggrandizement, they find much fitter employment for their armies than in enforcing democratic doctrines in the mountains and forests of Germany. They annoy their enemy quite in the regular, old-fashioned way; by demolishing his fortresses; by seizing on so much of his territories as they can conveniently hold; by levying contributions on his subjects; by forcing from him commercial immunities and privileges. They contend for wealth and dominion exactly in the style of Francis I. For the purposes of their ambition, they are willing to countenance and assist persons of every sect in politics and

convincing him that if it succeeds he will have warmer cloaths, better food, less work, and more brandy. There was one measure, and perhaps but one, that might have established the revolution in Poland—the complete emancipation of all the vassals from all personal subjection to their Lords. If, in addition to this enfranchisement, a small portion of land could have been given to each vassal at a moderate rent, the great and sudden melioration of the condition of the mass of the people, thus effected by the revolution, might have given them so strong an attachment to it, and occasioned them to make such zealous exertions in its defence, that the whole power of the Russian empire would have been insufficient to prevent its completion.

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religion; whether desirous of noble or popular rule; whether attached to monarchy or despotism; whether Deists or Atheists; whether baptized or infidel. To promote the aggrandizement of the French Republic, her rulers have given equal proofs of their attachment to the Grand Signor, the King of Prussia, the Lords of Piedmont, and the people of Lombardy; to the Papists of Milan, the Jews of Amsterdam, and the Mahometans of Constantinople. These are facts of notoriety, They prove that Mr. Burke's statement of the nature and principle of the war is fundamentally erroneous. It cannot be considered in any respect as a "civil war;" or a war against an "armed doctrine," or a nation of Propagandists. We contend with a nation of enterprising warriors. Our enemy is strictly "local and territorial." His strength consists in his territories, his fortresses, his armies, and in his abundant material resources, rendered formidable by his activity, and dangerous by his ambition. We have to repress the rulers of France as a Government endeavouring to extend their empire; not to exterminate them as a sect of fanatical Atheists attempting to barbarize the world.

From Mr. Burke's representation it would appear that France had been conquered, and is now governed by a tribe of atheistical vagabonds,

bonds, who had been roving about the world in quest of proselytes. But the truth is, that she is governed by her own citizens exclusively, and not by any such wandering tribe; and so jealous is she of any other than national Government, that her Constitution excludes from the humblest political privileges of a French citizen, all foreigners who have not lived within her territory for a sufficient time, to justify the presumption that they are nationally attached to her. The ambition of the French rulers is of the old kind, strictly national; and it must be guarded against and repressed in the old way. When this is effected, as far as circumstances require and will permit, peace may be made with the French Republic with as great safety to our Religion, Constitution, Property and Laws, as peace can be made with any other powerful, ambitious and enterprising State. The opinion that we should war with the '*existence*' and not the *conduct* of the French Republic, is as void of foundation, as it would be dreadful if adopted and acted upon.

To shew that her rulers aim at the destruction of every Government in Europe, Mr. Burke observes, that "they have hitherto constantly declined any other than a treaty with a single power," and that "they must be worse than blind who do not see with what undeviating

"regularity of system, in this case and in all cases,
"they pursue their scheme for the utter de-
"struction of every independent power, espe-
"cially the smaller, who can not find any refuge
"whatever but in some common cause*."

The French Government declared, in their answer to Lord Malmesbury's memorial, that they did not decline treating with Great Britain and her allies, conjointly. That they have hitherto preferred treating with their enemies singly, is no proof that they pursue a scheme for the utter destruction of them all. Their policy in this respect was so obvious, that they would have been extremely stupid if they had preferred any other. It is the policy by which a great confederacy is most likely to be broken and confounded; and the adoption of it by France proves no more than that she was desirous of getting rid of her enemies on the best terms. A confederacy of three nations is now formed against us. Suppose an ambassador were sent by the King of Spain to treat for peace with Great Britain; would your Grace advise his Majesty to decline treating until an ambassador should come from the French Republic? Would you not eagerly seize the opportunity of detaching an ally

* Page 41.
+ This answer did not appear until after the publication of Mr. Burke's letters.

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from the great enemy? If you had good reason to believe that his Majesty could now make a separate peace with the King of Spain, on as favorable terms as France obtained from several of the combined powers, would you not advise every measure, consistent with our just national dignity, to expedite such a fortunate event? Would you not defer, if not absolutely decline treating with our enemies conjointly, if you could treat with them separately, and were well assured that by doing so, you could procure for your country a more honorable and more advantageous peace? What would you think of the Republican politicians if they made this conduct of yours a subject of complaint and invective, and represented his Majesty's wisdom in providing for the safety, prosperity, and glory of his people, as a proof that he was pursuing a scheme for the utter destruction of every independent power? Would you not deem their accusation unfounded and ridiculous; and compare the authors of them to children, who in their little battles complain that their antagonists strike too hard? It would be as just, becoming, and magnanimous in the enemy to inveigh against us for the victories of our fleets and armies, as for the success of our negotiations.

Mr. Burke considers the change which France has made in her laws, manners, morals and usages
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as further evidence of her determined hostility to all mankind*.

It is impossible to proceed in the examination of this subject without remarking how grossly and flagitiously France has been calumniated by the persons from whom Mr. Burke derives his information. They who suppose that his descriptions of manners and morals in France † are just, must conclude that human nature itself has been completely changed in that country; that they are not men who inhabit it, but monsters in the human form, such as have been fabled by writers of wild and extravagant imagination.

His descriptions of the state of France are equally disgusting and unfounded: his abuse of her Government is gross and scurrilous in the highest degree. The French Republic he denominates “mother of monsters; bank of circulation of all pernicious principles; an infamous brothel; a night-cellar for such thieves, murderers and house-breakers as never infested the world—corrupted, bloody, fierce, hypocritical, perfidious, cannibal Republic.” Her rulers and supporters he calls “obscure ruffians, atheistical fanatics, murderers, systematic robbers; lewd and debauched

* Page 111.

+ From page 96, to page 107.

“banditti

"banditti, assassins, bravos and smugglers; cannibals, beasts of prey, furious and savage."—What credit is due to a writer who founds all his arguments upon such statements and representations as these? May it not be presumed, even from his manner of writing, that he uses much exaggeration; that his portraits are highly coloured by fiction, and that his furious and unbridled zeal has entirely perverted his judgement. Does not his addressing himself constantly to our passions, rather than to our understanding, prove that his cause is weak, and that it would not bear the test of calm and rational investigation?

Few points can be established by better evidence than that France bears no resemblance at this time, to the horrible Nation that he has described under her name. We know that the majority of her people are employed, either in the useful labours of agriculture, or in the more arduous and more virtuous duty of defending their country; that of the remainder, some are occupied in the important tasks of legislating, and of administering laws; others in high pursuits of science; others in the elegant cultivation of the arts; others in the acquisition of wealth; others in quest of renown: all actuated probably, by the same sort of motives, good and bad; fair, corrupt, and compounded, that urge the inhabitants.

inhabitants of this Island in their various pursuits. Is it possible that they are cannibals, savages, and obscure ruffians, who have been more careful than any Government in the world, in providing institutions for learned and useful education? Is it possible that those works of genius, judgment and erudition that come to us almost daily from France, and excite our warmest admiration, are executed by debauched banditti, assassins, bravos and smugglers? Does the history of the whole world exhibit a single instance of a debauched and depraved nation, possessing such a proud and ardent spirit of nationality as now animates the French people? No: their zealous and generous devotion to their country, in all the vicissitudes of her fortune, is utterly incompatible with depravity, debauchery and some other abominable vices that Mr. Burke lays to their charge. These would suffer no passions but the vile and selfish to exist in their minds. Some of their very faults; their haughtiness and arrogance with respect to foreign nations; their self-sufficiency and unreasonable pride; their perseverance in pursuit of whatever they undertake, just or unjust; their insolent and unbounded ambition, will rescue them from Mr. Burke's imputation of gross and savage wickedness, and demonstrate that they are not sunk in brutish depravity.

Your
amendment

Your Grace will not imagine from what I now say, that I am disposed to be the advocate of the French Government or the panegyrist of the French nation. I wish to represent it, as an enterprising and formidable enemy whom we should oppose, if we must still oppose, no otherwise than by fair hostility; and whose friendship we may accept of with honor whenever we can cultivate it with safety: not as an assemblage of vile and fanatical barbarians, who are hostile to the whole human race, and whom we must therefore pursue to utter destruction. I wish to refute the calumnies that might make his Majesty's people discontented with that measure (the formal recognition of the French Republic) which his Majesty was advised to adopt with a view to terminate the calamities of war. I wish to shew that a treaty of peace and alliance (which may Heaven accelerate,) may be made by us with the French Republic, without being disgraceful to England, or even in the smallest degree injurious to her high reputation.

Sooner or later peace must be made between France and England; but peace between such proud, martial and high-spirited nations can never be of long duration, whilst either of them is exasperated against the other; and it is impossible for this country not to be exasperated against France, if persuaded that Mr. Burke speaks the truth. I take it for granted, that a permanent

peace with France, would be much more beneficial to Great Britain than frequent wars with her. It is therefore, the duty of every British subject to prevent, as far as he is able, the irritation and exasperation which Mr. Burke's unjust invectives against France might produce in the public mind.

Continuing his strain of rancorous abuse, he asserts that the French Legislators* "have omitted " no pains to eradicate every benevolent and " noble propensity in the mind of man," and that " their law of divorce, like all their laws, had " not for its object the relief of domestic un- " easiness, but the total corruption of all morals, " the total disconnection of social life †."

On the very face of this statement it must (I hope) be a misrepresentation. I cannot believe there ever existed a body of men who undertook, with cool and steady design, to effect the total corruption of all morals. The rulers of France could have had no interested motive for attempting such atrocious and stupid wickedness. History does not exhibit any race of men, nor has any writer of correct imagination ever fabled a class of beings, coolly and steadily wicked without

* Page 101. † Page 104.

selfish inducements, or perpetrating mischief only for the delight of contemplating misery. Our great poet will not suffer even those Spirits, whom he represents as the source and perfection of every thing guilty and abominable, to pursue their projects without the impulse of a powerful motive. If the French Legislators meditated, as Mr. Burke asserts, the subjugation of the world of Europe to their laws, manners and opinions, they must have lost their senses if they would knowingly produce or encourage corruption of morals. The execution of that daring design would require the aid of every stern and rigid virtue; of courage unappalled by any dangers; of patience in difficulties and hardships; of devoted zeal; of perseverance against reverses of fortune; of prompt and blind obedience. It would have demanded the sacrifice of every private feeling, every selfish regard, to the public ambition. Would the practice of these virtues be promoted by an universal dissoluteness, and the total corruption of all morals?

Dissoluteness and corruption of morals, when spread over a whole nation, will inevitably give it a torpid, voluptuous, feeble and effeminate character. If France has formed a scheme of hostility against the human race, a law that would produce dissolute and licentious manners in a

considerable degree among all her citizens, would be more beneficial to mankind, and more ruinous to her guilty ambition, than the annihilation of half of her armies and the capture of all her frontier fortresses. No dissolute and debauched people have ever yet subverted the liberties of any considerable portion of the world. If the history of every age and nation can be depended on; if Lycurgus and the fathers of antient Rome are of any authority; if Bacon, More, Harrington, Montesquieu, Hume, and the whole race of speculative jurists and political philosophers are not completely mistaken, the Legislators of an aspiring, martial Republic should not only discourage, but should most rigourously repress licentious and dissolute manners. These manners destroy all the virtues, and even the vices that enable such a State to accomplish her ends. They render a people unable to endure the fatigues and hardships of military duty; loth to encounter dangers; unwilling to sacrifice, or even forego their ease and pleasures on any account, and careless, except as they are personally interested, of their country's glory or disgrace, her aggrandizement or her ruin. Dissolute manners are but little favorable to those shocking, unnatural exertions of patriotism, which have sometimes filled a whole people with a frantic spirit that has rendered them invincible and irresistible. Dissoluteness with all its

its evil is not universally corrupting. Although it always diminishes patriotism, it does not always extinguish the natural affections. I do not mean to deny that the opposite vices of unnatural severity, and extreme dissoluteness may exist in the same nation, and that the same city may contain a Brutus and a Messalina. But I maintain that the Legislators who wish to avail themselves of the rigid patriotism of the one, are mad if they encourage the depravity of the other: for that depravity, if become general, would not only prevent any prodigies of patriotism, but would destroy all rational attachment to the public cause.

Since the downfall of Jacobinism, we do not hear of any of those shocking exertions of public or party spirit, that were at one time so much applauded in France. By some persons, these patriotic enormities are called virtues, and they are generally characterised by an epithet taken, with great propriety indeed, from the name of that nation that robbed and enslaved as much as she could find of the world. I confess I feel abhorrence, not admiration, at those conquests of nationality over nature. I detest all laws, institutions, and opinions that require the man to be sacrificed to the State, and private virtues to public ambition. When such

Such sacrifices are demanded and applauded, the foundations of moral philosophy are rudely and dangerously shaken. The moral rules must vary according to political circumstances. Public opinion, the strongest sanction of moral law, will be depraved, and will afford all its authority to recommend as examples, those excesses and crimes which are committed, or may be pretended to be committed, with the most heroical intentions in the ardor of an ungovernable patriotism.

Country is a moral being that we have created ourselves, and that we support for our own advantage. It can neither destroy nor supercede the rights of those beings, to whom the Sovereign Legislator of the Universe, providing for our advantage by means, certainly much wiser and fitter than any that we can devise for that purpose, has drawn us by a stronger attachment, and bound us by a prior obligation. The factitious rights and duties cannot take place of the natural. Our country cannot require of us to forget our natural affections; to violate any duty or perpétrate any crime. If in some circumstances, she has the right to require the violation of any one duty or the perpetration of any one crime, she may in other circumstances have the right to require the violation of any other duty or the perpetration of any other crime; and therefore she may command us to

to violate all our natural duties and to perpetrate all sorts of crimes. If she can justly require you to murder your son, she may, by a less rigorous exaction, command you to betray your friend, to rob your benefactor, to violate your oath; and indeed all those crimes, when supposed to have been perpetrated from revolutionary motives, were applauded in France during the flagitious reign of the Jacobin faction. But this moral being, Country, exists only for the general good, which is it's law, and which sets limits to its claims. It cannot therefore require what would be so utterly subversive of the general good, as the violation of natural duties and the perpetration of crimes.

A blind, unlimited, and exclusive devotion to cause and country, has occasioned some of the greatest calamities that have ever scourged the human race. It was a vicious enthusiasm that enabled the Roman robbers to pillage the Earth, and a few wretched and ignorant fanatics of the desert, to barbarize almost all the nations of Asia, and one of the finest and most celebrated portions of Europe. A furious zeal has often made the mildest of all theological systems, the Christian religion, appear the most detestable; and has transformed that dispensation of mercy into a cruel scourge. Liberty, the greatest of all temporal blessings, when cherished and supported by a rational

rational attachment, has been made by the rash enthusiasm of its advocates, to produce as much misery as the most savage despotism. It was this frantic principle that gave success for a time to the Jacobins, and had almost enabled them to plant their affiliated and associated gangs, more abominable than that murderous Junto that Sparta imposed upon the vanquished Athenians, in the midst of the finest countries on the continent of Europe. Happily for the quiet and safety of the world, this savage and ferocious enthusiasm has expired in France along with the system that gave it birth. Her people are still animated in her cause by a warm and generous zeal: a passion as remote from the furious and dangerous Jacobin enthusiasm, as inconsistent with a corrupt and depraved national character.

During the whole discussion on the law of divorce, the object of which, according to Mr. Burke, was the total corruption of all morals, I happened to be in Paris, and to be acquainted with some of the members of the National Assembly who were active in support of that measure. I am firmly persuaded that they had no such objects in view as the corruption of morals and the total disconnection of social life. They acted in this instance as in many others, without sufficient caution and consideration. The law of divorce

was

was adopted in the delirium of liberty*: An indissoluble engagement of any kind, appeared to the democratic enthusiasts, destructive of freedom. They expatiated on the dissoluteness and domestic misery that prevailed throughout France, occasioned, as they asserted, by the abuse of the ancient paternal power, and by the licentious manners that had grown up under the ancient system. The object of the law of divorce was not to corrupt morals, but to relieve the domestic disquietudes that corrupt morals had produced: but although

* Mr. Burke, (through inadvertency I presume) has stated the law of divorce inaccurately. He says in page 102, " Proceeding in the spirit of the first authors of their Constitution, succeeding assemblies went the full length of the principle, and gave a license to divorce at the mere pleasure of either party, and *at a month's notice.*"—The law of divorce, passed by the National Assembly in September 1792, provided, that when either party demanded to be divorced without the consent of the other, and assigned no other cause for the demand, than incompatibility of tempers and dispositions, the person making the demand should signify it to a municipal officer, who was directed to cause the relations of both parties to have a meeting at the expiration of three months. If they could not then reconcile the couple, they were to hold a second meeting, for the same friendly purpose, at the expiration of three months from the time of the first meeting; and if this second attempt at reconciliation failed, the divorce, if insisted upon was allowed without further delay. A divorce at the pleasure of either party was therefore not permitted without at least *six month's notice.*—See *La Loi de Divorce.*

its purpose was good, its operation was certainly pernicious. It did not sufficiently restrain capricious separations, nor sufficiently protect those who stand most in need of protection. It abandoned the most feeble and most amiable of our species to the mercy of those who, if they ever have the detestable inclination, will always have the power to injure them. The zeal of the authors of this law prevented them from foreseeing its consequences, or from considering them with sufficient attention. In the estimation of those enthusiasts, nothing was of account when set in opposition to boundless liberty. But Mr. Burke will attribute nothing of the conduct of the revolutionists, no not a single act or endeavour, to mistaken zeal; nothing to wild, extravagant enthusiasm; nothing even to ignorance, stupidity or folly, or to any other cause that might in any degree extenuate their errors. He finds the source of every one of their measures in wicked cunning; in cold, designing villainy; in determined hostility to the human race; in persecuting atheism; in systems of pure, unchequered guilt; in the radical depravity, and the inherent, inveterate, incurable corruption of their nature.

Speaking of the new laws, usages and manners of France, he makes these observations, "The whole body of this new system of manners in
" sup-

" support of the new scheme of politics, I consider
 " as a strong and decisive proof of determined
 " ambition and systematic hostility. I defy the
 " most refining ingenuity to invent any other
 " cause for the total departure of the Jacobin
 " Republic from every one of the ideas and usages,
 " religious, legal, moral, or social, of this civi-
 " lized world, and for tearing herself from it's
 " communion with such studied violence, but
 " from a formed resolution of keeping no terms
 " with that world*."

No refining ingenuity is requisite to shew that the new system of Government of France demanded a corresponding system of laws, usages and manners, and that she could not effectually establish the one without the aid of the other. Having abolished the feudal system, as well as all the privileges, immunities, and distinctions of the Orders, and lastly, the Monarchical Government, she acted only with common sense in abolishing all the feudal or gothic laws and usages; all the adopted titles of the Roman law that related to monarchical Government, and all the laws, customs, manners, and usages that had any connexion with the feudal system, with the privileges, immunities, and distinctions of the Orders, or with the power, influence, and splendor of the throne. A revolution in the system of Government can never be completed

* Page 111

unless laws, usages, and manners above all, are made congenial with the new order of things. If the old laws and manners remain, they will perpetually recall the old system of Government to remembrance; they will make its loss regretted, and in the course of time, or at any favorable opportunity, they may occasion its restoration. I doubt whether the laws of landed property that are deduced from the feudal institutions, and the customs and manners that prevailed in France, during her ancient regimen, could exist in a democratic republic. If they could exist in it for any time, they would be at perpetual variance with the spirit of the Government. It would sit heavily and awkwardly upon them. It would keep them in continual fear, and subject them to unceasing vexation. They would always sigh for the return of that Government, that instead of threatening, insulting, and despising, would foster and protect them. How came it that at the restoration of our Charles IInd, the Republican Government expired in England without a struggle or a groan? Because the old laws, usages, customs, and manners had been left almost untouched. Every thing was congenial with the old Constitution. The country was conquered by the fanatics as by a band of Mamelukes, but not revolutionized. She thought, felt, and acted monachically. Republicanism was violence during this time. The restoration of the old

Constiti-

Constitution was the restoration of the natural order of things, and it was accomplished with a facility that appears incredible to those who do not sufficiently consider the powerful influence of usages and manners. The people naturally exulted at the restoration of the system from which their prejudices and affections had never been drawn away by any revolutionary artifices. Much as its re-establishment was facilitated and accelerated by its own merits, it was greatly indebted to the ignorance and stupidity of its fanatical enemies. They had no management. They knew nothing but vile cant. Although complete masters of the country for eleven years, those barbarous usurpers could make no impression upon it, except what was ruinous to themselves, their Government, and their religion.

Far different has been the conduct of the Revolutionists of France. They have suffered nothing to remain that could militate against the genius of their institutions. La Vendée was the only part of France impervious to their revolutionary operations, and its long and zealous attachment to the ancient system may be attributed, in a considerable degree, to the little change that was effected in it by the revolutionary measures. All these circumstances should be well weighed by those whom the restoration of Charles II^d. still encourages

encourages to expect the re-establishment of the throne of Bourbon. We can account very satisfactorily for the change which the French Republic has made in her laws, customs, usages and manners, without supposing with Mr. Burke, that she had formed a "resolution of keeping no terms with the world," or that she had any other motive in this instance, than a strong desire of firmly establishing, maintaining, and perpetuating her own system of Government within her own dominions.

The change in her laws has not been quite so great as Mr. Burke represents. Most of the articles of the Roman law, relating to promises, contracts, and other objects, and not interfering with the Republican system, that were formerly adopted by France, are still found in her code, and are meant to be preserved, if Cambacères has spoken the sense of her Legislature.

But if the change in her laws, manners and usages had been as great as possible, it would not only not be a good ground of eternal war with her, but it might not prevent an eternal peace between her and every nation in Europe. We have long been at peace with nations who differ from us in almost every thing in which human beings can differ; in form of Government, religion, laws, customs,

tombs, ceremonies, manners, prejudices and opinions; with the Ottoman Empire; with the States of Barbary; with Poland and Russia. The good understanding that we have maintained with those States cannot be wholly attributed to their distance from us, since our navy would speedily bring them all within reach of our power. Our wars have been almost always with the countries whose governments, laws, manners, and usages most nearly resembled our own. "Resemblances, conformities, and sympathies*", do indeed lead us to associate; but they very often occasion us to quarrel. They make us pursue the same objects: they therefore create rivalry and contention. "Nothing," says Mr. Burke, "is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation, as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life." Yet such a correspondence between the States of Greece formerly, and between many of the nations of Europe in modern times, by giving them the same views, the same wants, the same sort of ambition, and by urging them to the attainment of their objects in the same manner, caused perpetual rivalships, jealousies, animosities and contentions between them. Nations that are candidates for the same sort of power, wealth and renown, must frequently clash in their pursuits,

* Page 108.

and

and the discordance will produce irritation enough to occasion a rupture. France and England have long sought to acquire wealth, dominion, and influence in the world, by the same means, and they have found in almost every object of their ambition a source of disagreement.

Those resemblances between nations have often made theirwars more rancorous as well as more frequent. The most trivial disagreements have occasioned the most spiteful and sanguinary conflicts. Mr. Burke observes with satisfaction that "the nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines." Yet these ceremonies and subordinate doctrines; the fashion of a hood; the placing of a table; the dress of a priest; the decorations of a church; the mode of commemorating the circumstance on which our religion is founded; the form of a prayer; the most trivial and unintelligible tenets have produced amongst Christians as rancorous and bloody wars as they have ever maintained against the Pagan or the Mahometan; and have occasioned the most cruel and atrocious banishments, imprisonments, persecutions, burnings, assassinations and massacres that disgrace the annals of the world.

If,

If, at the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. France had become dissimilar to this country in every respect, by being suddenly converted to the Mahometan religion, and to Mahometan politics, opinions, manners, usages and habits of life, such as they are at this time, we might not have had one contest with her ever since. She would not have given herself the least concern whether we were Papists, Lutherans or Calvinists; whether our King was a Tudor or a Stuart, or of the illustrious Line of Brunswick; whether the High Church or the Low Church, the Whig or the Tory preponderated in our Legislature. She would have viewed with great indifference and composure our rising colonies in America; our conquests in the East and West Indies; our commercial monopolies; and we should have contemplated her affairs without any emotion except what might arise from our curiosity; little anxious about the intrigues of the Divan or the Seraglio; little concerned whether the sect of Ali or the sect of Omar was triumphant. It is difficult to suppose any cause of rupture with France, in this situation, not originating with ourselves. Thus a total dissimilitude in laws, customs, manners and habits of life, instead of being the cause of perpetual enmity, may be a strong preservative of perpetual peace between nations.

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I have hitherto maintained little more than that peace *may* be made, safely and honorably, with the French Republic. On the advantages of peace it is unnecessary to expatiate. The topic, although so fertile, has been nearly exhausted.

There is however, one among those advantages that has not been considered with the attention it merits: I mean the happy influence that peace would have upon the French Republic; in soothing her sufferings; in mollifying her stern character; in lowering her high military spirit; in destroying what may yet remain of the revolutionary enthusiasm; in a word in directing all her valour, enterprise, perseverance, activity and energy to other purposes than conquest or destruction. She might soon be distinguished for refinement and blessed with prosperity. I shall be told, perhaps, that she would then become a formidable commercial rival to Great Britain. Be it so. She will be a much less dangerous rival to us as a commercial than as a warlike Republic. It is in vain to deny it: Great commerical prosperity tends not only to mollify and refine, but to enfeeble a national character. A nation of rich merchants and manufacturers is a far less formidable foe, than a nation of fierce and hungry warriors.

If I were perfectly neutral in this great contest,
I should wish very sincerely for the peaceful
happi-

happiness of so large a portion of my fellow beings as the people of France. But as one of their enemies, I wish for it most ardently. What would be our situation if we had reduced France to extreme poverty and wretchedness, and had deprived her of all hope of improving her condition, except by conquest or plunder? The exuberance of her population, impelled by political passions only, carried terror and dismay into most of the Nations of Europe. What then would she not atcheive if, impelled by the necessity of preserving life and by vengeance, as well as by enthusiasm, her whole race were to gush forth on all sides, uniting Vandal fury with Spartan valor and Roman perseverance and the military science in higher perfection than it was ever possessed by any other people? I confess I sincerely hope that France may soon become rich enough to have more to fear than to hope from the depredations of war, and that she may derive so much prosperity and happiness from the re-establishment of peace, as to make her ardently desirous of its eternal preservation.

It is evident that a general peace would have the happiest influence upon France. The partial treaties of peace which she has already made, have had it in so great a degree as to have divested her of the savage ferocity that marked her character whilst she was assailed by all the confederate

powers. I consider the effect that a peace of tolerable duration would have upon the martial spirit and the political ardor of the French people, of such importance, that I believe the French Republic, bounded by the Rhine, the Mountains, the Mediterranean and the Ocean, would be a less formidable enemy after ten years of peace, than she would be at this time if her empire did not extend beyond the territories she possessed at the commencement of the war. It is not long since Spain has become her ally and our enemy. The event did not depreciate our funds an hundredth part of their value. Spain is a quiet, sober, regular antagonist. Her friend has not been able to communicate to her a spark of his fire. One Spain coming against us fresh out of a revolution, would be worse than a dozen of such enemies as Spain is now*.

It has been urged that the conduct of the French Republic to some of her enemies and

* Mr. Burke, having discussed the subject of the equivalent to be offered to France for the cession of the territories conquered by her from our allies, makes the following mysterious observation, " If you or others see a way out of these difficulties, I am happy. I see indeed a fund from whence equivalents will be proposed. I see it, but I cannot just now touch it. It is a question of high moment, It opens another Iliad of woes to Europe." See page 156. Concerning the nature of this fund I have formed various, but unsatisfactory conjectures.

to all the powers she has made peace with, should deter us from making any peace with her at all. Mr. Burke accuses her of negotiating with the insolence of ancient Rome, and he seems to regard each of her Generals as a Brennus*. "Spain," says Mr. Burke, "is a Province of the Jacobin Empire, and she must make peace or war according to the orders she receives from the Directory of Assassins." That the French Directory have great influence over her councils cannot be doubted. But it seems to have been acquired in some degree by diplomatic address. It is certain at least, that if her situation is as Mr. Burke represents it, she is ignorant of her abasement. She would not otherwise dare to speak of her masters in the contemptuous and insulting language she applied to them in her answer to the remonstrance of the Court of Petersburgh concerning her conduct to the allied powers. When she published that answer she must have forgotten that "the Regicide Ambassador" (the French Ambassador) "governed at Madrid." And he too must be unacquainted with the extent of his power, or he would not suffer such an outrage on his dignity to remain unpunished.

* "With their spear they draw a circle about us."—Page 61.
"He is the Gaul that puts his *sword* into the scale."—Page 13.

Prussia has also been supposed to furnish proofs of French insolence. This has been presumed in consequence of the permission granted by his Prussian Majesty to the French Citizens who reside in his territories, to distinguish themselves by the revolutionary decoration. But from the conduct and views of the Directory and the King of Prussia when this distinction was allowed, it is extremely improbable that he granted it without some sort of compensation. The strength of his dominions, and their position with respect to the French Republic, forbid the supposition that she ever compelled him to make regulations of internal police.

There is not one of the other States with which she has made peace that bears such a relation to her, as would exist between the British empire and her, after the termination of the war. The power of waging war is the best guarantee for preserving peace; and when a country refuses to treat with her enemy until he has deprived her of that power she lies wholly at his mercy, and can expect nothing but permission to capitulate. The French Republic, like every other conquering State, has often consulted her magnanimity less than her interest and her pride. But I entertain too high a confidence in our own power to apprehend that she will ever presume to treat Great Britain like one of the petty States of Italy.

With

With respect to our material resources for supporting war, by which I mean men and military apparatus of every kind, I can see no end to them, provided the people will contribute to the utmost extent of their ability. But if they refuse to contribute, except in the usual, regular, and moderate manner; if they are animated by no fervent zeal; no glowing patriotism, to support them under privations and in distresses; if, in short, they will not give every thing beyond what is necessary to support themselves to support their country, I am apprehensive that this war cannot be long continued without very great embarrassment.

On the subject of the military resources of nations, I think very erroneous opinions have been prevalent. It is not in money of any description, paper or metallic, that the actual resources of a country consist, nor is it by the credit of assignats or mandats, or the price of any public fund that we can estimate the real ability of France or England. If a country produce men, ships, provisions, arms and ammunition in sufficient abundance, or what will be nearly as well, sufficient of other valuable commodities to purchase what she does not produce; and if her people are willing, or can be made, to contribute them for her service, she may wage war, defensive or offensive, as long as they last, without possessing a

single

single piece of coin, or any notes representing coin, and without being obliged to support any paper-currency by plunder. Those representatives of value, which have been mistakenly considered as real resources, are no more than useful instruments for obtaining the actual instruments of war. They greatly facilitate, but they are not absolutely necessary to the transfer of them from the subject to the Government. In some situations the Government may lay their hands on whatever they want for the public service in the first instance. But in such countries as France and England, an able minister can never be driven to adopt this oppressive mode of supply. He must be extremely ignorant of the science of finance, who could not maintain a good paper currency, having the whole surplus produce of a wealthy nation to support it. If every piece of coin, and every note, bill and debenture in Great Britain were suddenly annihilated, the loss would not render us unable to carry on a long and vigorous war, if the population and produce of the country continued as at present, and if her people were animated in support of the contest. In these circumstances I am persuaded we could successfully resist all Europe for as long a time as Mr. Burke thinks it probable that the present war may continue. The loss of the present circulating medium, although it would occasion extreme

extreme embarrassment until a paper currency were well established, would not deprive us of men or arms, or of any of the materials for attack or defence, except what the annihilated coin could have purchased from Foreign Countries. Nothing, indeed, short of a palpable State necessity would justify the creation of a paper currency in a great commercial nation. It is an expedient productive of much evil, and I trust we shall never be compelled to adopt it. If, however, a paper currency were our only resource, it might be maintained at par by imposing annual taxes, to be paid with the paper money only, to the amount of the paper money annually issued. It might even preserve its full nominal value, if that amount exceeded those taxes in a certain degree. So much of the paper money as would be absorbed by commerce, might be safely issued, over and above the quantity of that money that would be returned to Government by the taxes. If this currency should fail, another could be raised upon different principles. Taxes might be imposed on actual produce, and the payment exacted in kind. What they yielded might be lodged in the Public Store-houses, and such articles as the Government had no occasion for, might be sold for the paper money to keep up its value; and with this paper money the Government might purchase what they could

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not obtain by direct taxation or requisition*. This last sort of paper currency, or rather this mode of supporting one, is awkward and embarrassing. It can only be necessary, when the first sort of paper money has failed, through extravagance, bad faith, or financial inability? France has fully shewn since the revolution, what real military resources consist of; and she has completely refuted the opinion that the want of money, or even the ruin of a system of finance, must necessarily disable a country from prosecuting a war with vigor.

At the beginning of the revolution, the coin of France disappeared. Its place was supplied by the Assignats, supported chiefly by the immense wealth of the Church. Rich, however, as the

A great part of the internal commerce of the State of Virginia, is carried on through the medium of a paper currency, called tobacco money. The owners of tobacco, of a certain quality, are permitted to lodge it in the warehouses of the State. Receipts, specifying the quantity deposited, are given to them, and are circulated as the signs of so much value, which, as the quality of the article represented is always ascertained, can be appreciated with tolerable exactness. The Government of Virginia, if they possessed no specie, might impose a tax upon tobacco to be paid in kind, and issue tobacco notes for the service of the State, payable at the public warehouse in so much tobacco as the notes represented.

estate

estate was that was mortgaged for them, various causes reduced their value so much, that they were at last hardly worth the expence of fabrication. Yet in their lowest State, France supplied her armies with the most lavish profusion. She produced every thing they wanted, and her Government were masters of every thing that she produced. For a short time they levied taxes on property in kind, and when pressed hard, they made direct requisitions. Another paper currency (the Mandats) has been established, and has succeeded in part. Where it fails, metallic money is obtained to supply the deficiency. During the greatest of the fiscal distresses of France, she carried on the war against the allies with an energy that cannot be derived from the most flourishing finances, unaided by the power of enthusiasm.

Extensive, I had almost said infinite, as our material resources now are, I do not think that we should be able to accomplish the objects for which Mr. Burke advises the continuance of the war, if every one of us were convinced of the justness of his opinions, and fired with the ardor of his zeal. The Republican system of France was at one time assailed by 500,000 men, on the very lowest computation; consisting of the armies of La Vendée; those of the King of Spain, the late King of Sardinia, the Italian States, the King of

Prussia, the Emperor, the Germanic Princes, Holland and England. Most of those armies were highly enraged against the enemy; and they were all composed of brave, active and disciplined troops, and were commanded by many of the ablest generals in Europe. Yet this mighty force not only failed in its object, but failed without ever having been near the attainment of it. It failed without ever having been in a situation that permits us now to presume, that it would have been completely successful, if it had been increased by two or three hundred thousand men. These numerous, well-conducted, well-appointed, obedient, brave, active, enthusiastic, mighty armies, not only failed of the conquest of the French Republic, but they were themselves vanquished by the French Republic in a shorter space of time, and with severer, more terrible, more murderous defeat than any other force of equal magnitude, whose discomfiture is recorded in the annals of the modern world. No person in his senses would think of attempting the conquest of the French Republic, or what is the same, the subversion of her political system, in this moment of her prosperity and triumph, with less than double the force, which was so extremely inadequate to that achievement in the days of her greatest difficulties and deepest affliction. Were a million of troops at our disposal, (a force which in our present circumstances it is hardly

hardly necessary to say we cannot bring to act offensively against her) I am not so sanguine as to believe, that we could change the system of her Government. Among the enemies with whom we should have to contend, I look upon Louis XVIII. and his counsellors to be very formidable. Indeed the councils of the exiled Princes, appear as if guided by Sieyes. All their addresses, proclamations, and publications of every sort concerning their principles and views, seem dictated by the genius of the French Republic. They breathe nothing but vengeance against all who have in the smallest degree forwarded any part, or any measure of the revolution; and against all who shall not assist in restoring, rigidly and completely, every part of the old system of Government; every part of a system of which some parts are universally detested by the whole French nation*. Experience has given no wisdom,

* In a work published by order of the French Princes, entitled, "Développement des principes fondamentaux de la Monarchie Françoise," the Royal Prerogative is defined to be "La Reunion du pouvoir législatif, judiciaire & exécutif, le roi étant le Seul Souverain Seigneur, le Legislateur unique, en lui résidant exclusivement la plénitude de l'autorité suprême." It is even asserted that "Le Roi lui-même ne peut changer en rien l'antique Constitution."

In another work of the same kind the following classification is made of those whom it will be necessary to punish, when the

Counter-

wisdom, adversity has taught no moderation to those unhappy exiles. We could not have had less desirable allies to support. If the French people were the most torpid or sober, in place of being the most animated of all Republicans, the proclamations of the Princes would rouse them into rage, and make them resist with all their might the restoration of the ancient monarchy. Such a King as Louis XVIII. would cause an insurrection on our Royal Exchange.

Fortunately for this Country, and perhaps for the whole world, his Majesty has not been advised to continue the war for the purpose of effecting a Counter-revolution in France. Indeed, as far as France only is concerned, there seems no attainable object of value, for which the continuance of the war against her would be advisable.

Counter-revolution takes place.—1. Ceux qui par une affreuse combinaison demanderent les Etats Generaux.—2. Les hommes siévement obscurs.—3. *Les amis des Nouveautés.*—4. Les mécontents.—5. Les ingrats.—6. Les philosophes ou Athées.—7. Les Protestants.—8. Les Speculateurs abstraits.—9. Les partisans des deux Chambres.—10. Le parti d'Orléans.—11. Celui de M. Necker.—12. Les Républicains.—13. Tous ceux sans exceptions qui préterent le serment du Jeu de Paume.—14. Les Monarchiens.—15. Les Monarquistes.—16. Les Feuillans.—17. Les Ministériels.—18. Les Administrateurs.—19. Les Membres des Sociétés & des Clubs.—20. Les débris de la première Législature.—21. *Les Successeurs qu'elle se choisit.*

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Her commerce as an object of booty is contemptible. Almost all her possessions in both the Indies are ours, except the Island of St. Domingo, which I am told the whole force of England would be insufficient to subdue. As for France herself, she lies before us, a mighty and impenetrable mass of strength. At home, I trust that we are equally invulnerable; and that although we have not like France, a chain of fortresses to impede an invader, we are as firmly protected, should even our navy fail, by the rampart that made Sparta so long invincible, a wall of men. Externally our situation is not quite so strong. Our extensive commerce, and our rich and numerous colonies, render us vulnerable in every quarter of the world. The peril in which these may be placed deserves serious consideration. But there are other objects of superior importance. Great Britain has much more at stake than her colonies and her commerce. Ardently as I wish for a speedy peace, and sanguine as is my hope that it will be the foundation of uninterrupted friendship between France and England, and the forerunner of unexampled prosperity to the people of both nations, it would be the last advice I would offer to my country, to sacrifice her freedom for the preservation of her wealth, or to purchase tranquillity with dishonor.

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The manner in which the Directory have broken off the negotiations must be highly afflicting to every one who wishes for the termination of the war. The advocate for peace is extremely embarrassed by their conduct. It has rendered our situation highly difficult. Difficult, however, and embarrassing as it is, I trust that the magnitude of the evil will suggest some remedy, and that both parties will sacrifice something of punctilio to put an end to the effusion of human blood, and to all the other dreadful calamities of this murderous conflict.

But if no remedy can be found; if Great Britain can not make peace consistently with her dignity and independence, let the war be prosecuted if possible, for some object that may compensate for its calamities. There is one of the allies of France whose American possessions, probably in no very good state of defence, would be a most valuable prize. Let us endeavour to punish the perfidy of Spain, and to gain an equivalent for the Netherlands in Mexico and Peru. The oppression which the native and the African inhabitants of those rich and extensive territories endure from their Spanish tyrants, and the disaffection which it has occasioned, are notorious. Why then should we not adopt the energy, without the extravagance, of that policy which has served France in the

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West Indies instead of fleets and armies? Why should we not enlist enthusiasm into our service, and aid our arms with the generous principles of English liberty? To subdue Spanish America by mere force, may be impossible. To wrest it from its oppressors, by emancipating its enslaved inhabitants, may be a project as practicable as it would be just and glorious. The emancipation that I mean is such as its objects are capable of receiving, a deliverance from physical evil; from bodily endurance; not the emancipation that was given by the French Convention, which instantly placed the slave on a footing with the most enlightened freeman, in regard to political rights, and which was equally injurious to the happiness of both freeman and slave.

The West India Gentlemen will probably object to this project. Its success might endanger what they call their property. He must be a wretched politician who does not see that the preservation of our Empire in the West Indies will require a speedy change of system with regard to the negroes; thank God that it will require it, and that what could not be obtained from humanity will be wrung from avarice.

I think it is certain that all the troops we have in the West Indies, and all we can conveniently

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send there, will be inadequate to contend against the decree which abolished slavery throughout all the territories of the French Republic. We have already felt the influence of this decree severely. But what we have hitherto experienced from it, is trivial in comparison of what is yet to be apprehended. It's operation is powerful in proportion to it's notoriety, and it becomes every day more and more known to those from whom it is endeavoured to be concealed. We cannot oppose it but by something similar to it. We deceive ourselves if we imagine that we have so far brutalized the negroes, or rather degraded them below the state of the brute creation, that they cannot distinguish between freedom and slavery; between a generous deliverer and a cruel tyrant. We must meliorate their condition if we expect to retain their fidelity. I hope it was with a view to their happiness (that, is to their final emancipation, for what happiness can co-exist with slavery?) that our ambassador was instructed to treat concerning them with the French Government. Perhaps his suggestions related to the plan that was once mentioned in the House of Commons by Mr. Dundas for abolishing slavery all over the world. Mr. Dundas thought this might be effected in our West-India Islands, gradually and without danger, by suffering slavery to expire with the present race of slaves, and by giving their masters a certain right
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to the services of their children, until the age of twenty-one, as a compensation for the expence of maintaining them in infancy.

I have long observed with regret, the abatement of the virtuous fervor with which the whole nation at one time espoused the cause of the injured Africans. We have now stronger reason than ever to interest ourselves in their welfare. It is connected with our prosperity, perhaps with our independence. We require every possible aid to combat the French Republic, and if we refuse to mitigate the servitude of the negroes, now that France offers them freedom, we may not only lose them as faithful servants, but have to oppose them as fierce and exasperated enemies. This might entirely deprive us of our West India possessions, which are so fruitful a source of supply for the treasury, or might divert so much of our force to defend them, as would leave our more important dominions exposed to the attacks of the ever vigilant and enterprizing enemy.

Whatever the wisdom of Parliament may determine with respect to the Negroes of our own colonies, I trust that your Grace will never be induced by the apprehensions of slave-dealers, to advise his Majesty to reject any honorable project for national aggrandizement, or to hesitate at making
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one grand exertion to emancipate the new world; to obtain an ample indemnity for all our losses; to win such an accession of dominion and renown as would be equivalent to all that the enemy has acquired in both; and to secure an advantageous and glorious peace.

I have the honor to be,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

JAMES WORKMAN,
of the Legion Republic, and it was
written in the course of the war.
This work will be published
In the Press, and speedily, will be published,
(BY THE SAME AUTHOR,)
TREATISE

EXERCISE and MANCEUVRE

BATTALION.

